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SEARCH AND SEIZURE-STOP AND FRISK-REASONABL ENESS OF A PER-
SONAL SEARCH IN AN AIRPORT SETTING-United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44
(5th Cir. 1973).
Disembarking from his flight into San Antonio, Abraham Pina Moreno entered
the lounge area of the San Antonio International Airport. Already he had come
under the purposeful gaze of Deputy U.S. Marshall Granados of the airport's
Anti-Air Piracy detail. Granados' attention was drawn by Moreno's wariness,
attention to security guards, and visible nervousness. Moreno, by now conscious
that he was under surveillance, left the terminal and ordered a taxicab to the
bus station.
Two hours later Moreno again entered the terminal concourse, still obviously
nervous. After switching among several ticket lines, he finally purchased a South-
west Airlines ticket and headed toward the boarding gate, once again followed
by Granados' now suspicious stare. As Moreno approached Granados' position
and the officer moved forward, their eyes met, and Moreno abruptly turned and
entered a restroom. Following him into the restroom, Granados noticed that More-
no appeared to be protecting something in his left coat pocket, which was bulging
prominently. Granados had seen enough; accosting Moreio and identifying him-
self, Granados asked if anything was wrong. Moreno replied that he had arrived
in San Antonio the day before and was upset at the fare charged by the taxicab
driver bringing him to the airport from the hospital, where he had been visiting
a sick relative. Granados recognized the fabrication, having seen Moreno's previous
arrival and departure. Granados then requested identification. After some hesita-
tion Moreno produced some identification, and then started to turn away. Grana-
dos, fearing that Moreno was about to break for an exit, summoned another officer
to help escort Moreno to the security office.
Once in the office, Granados conducted a pat-down search, then asked what
Moreno had in his left coat pocket. Moreno pulled out some papers, but the
bulge remained. He was then ordered to remove his coat, and three packages of
heroin were extracted from the pocket. He was arrested, tried, and convicted
of possession of heroin with intent to distribute. His motion to suppress the
evidence on the ground that the search of his person exceeded the limitations
of Terry v. Ohio' was denied, the district court recognizing the special need for
stop and frisk procedures in preventing air piracy attempts.
I. ExPANDING THE Terry DOCTRINE.
When Moreno appealed, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with
two fundamental issues. First, did the facts of this case allow a stop and frisk
on the basis of the Terry doctrine of street encounters? And second, does the
fact that the encounter occurred in an airport alter the test of reasonableness as
stated in Terry?
The Supreme Court stated in Terry:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct
which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the en-
1392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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counter serves to dispell his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety,
he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to con-
duct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such
a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any
weapons seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person
from whom they were taken.2
If the search is valid under Terry, items found during the search which are ad-
missible as evidence in court include not only weapons, but, under the concept
labelled by Professor LaFave as the "serendipity doctrine," s may include any ma-
terial which might be useful in proving a crime.
The major problem facing the Moreno court in applying the Terry doctrine
was the apparent lack of concern on the part of Officer Granados that Moreno
might pose a threat to his safety. The Supreme Court, in deciding Terry, stated
that the purpose of allowing stop and frisk procedures is to permit a police officer
who reasonably believes that criminal activity may be imminent to approach the
person under surveillance and ask questions. In order to prevent his first question
from being met with a bullet,4 he has a right to conduct a pat-down search of
the outer clothing of the person being questioned in order to discover any concealed
weapon which could be used to assault the officer or those nearby. Here, Officer
Granados asked questions first, and then conducted a personal search. Appellant
in his brief pointed out that Granados permitted Moreno to reach into -his bulging
coat pocket twice during their encounter, once when he asked for identification
in the restroom and Moreno produced his wallet from that pocket, and again
in the security office when he asked what Moreno had in his pocket and Moreno
reached in and pulled out a wad of paper.
If Granados believed that the bulging pocket contained a weapon, permitting
the pocket to go unsearched and allowing Moreno to pull items repeatedly from
that pocket were, to say the least, imprudent. Moreover, his marching Moreno
through a crowded airport concourse with myriad opportunities to grab a hostage
and escape, when he could have disarmed. Moreno in the unoccupied restroom,
tends to strengthen the theory that Granados in fact did not, believe that Moreno
was armed and dangerous. Finally, when Granados conducted a pat-down search
in the security office, he did not detect any weapons, nor did he make an attempt
to identify, by feeling or squeezing, the contents of the pocket. Terry by itself
permits no more than a pat-down search of outer clothing in an attempt to discover
weapons,3 and implies that the police officer in that case acted correctly only be-
cause he did not search inside the subject's clothing until he had detected a weapon.6
In contrast, Granados searched Moreno's inside coat pocket without ever detecting
a possible weapon, and, perhaps, without even suspecting that Moreno was armed.
Faced with these deviations from the permissible stop and frisk situation de-
scribed in Terry, the court emphasized that the Terry decision permits stop and
frisk procedures to ensure the safety not only of police officers but also of others.
2 Id. at 30.
3LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond,
67 MAcH. L REv. 40, 92 (1968). See also Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960);
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), overruled on other grounds, Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752 (1969); cf. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
4 392 U.S. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
5 Id. at 30.
Old. at 29.
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The court construed "others" in this case to be persons departing San Antonio
aboard commercial aircraft.7 The court then described the acute problems which
air piracy presents to law enforcement officials, declared that "society's law enforce-
ment capabilities have not caught up with these problems,"8 and therefore found
that airport security searches are to be treated as exceptional and exigent situations
under the fourth amendment.9 Analogizing an airport to a border crossing, the
court declared that both are critical zones to which special fourth amendment con-
siderations should apply. Because all skyjackers must pass through airports before
committing their crime, and because skyjackers are otherwise so difficult to detect,
the court held in applying Terry that security officers should not -be limited to
a pat-down search, which, though sufficient to detect handguns, is not thorough
enough to detect carefully concealed explosives or other weapons. Thus in an
airport concourse, a police officer who, from observation of an individual ticket-
holder, has formed a reasonable belief that the individual is contemplating an
air piracy attempt and is carrying weapons or explosives for that purpose, may
search the individual. Such a search is not limited to a pat-down of outer dothing,
but may include a search inside the subject's pockets.
Although rationalized under the Terry decision, the holding in Moreno was
based on the need to protect passengers and crew on the aircraft rather than
the investigating officer himself. Thus the court had no difficulty reconciling with
Terry the fact that the personal search occurred after interrogation and the trip
across the concourse, since the search did occur before Moreno had gained access
to the aircraft itself. Whether or not Officer Granados perceived immediate danger
to himself or those in the concourse was irrelevant, so long as he perceived a
possible danger to passengers boarding the aircraft at the airport, and acted to
alleviate that danger before Moreno could approach the aircraft.
It is unfortunate that the court chose to characterize its ratio decidendi as an
application of Terry to the facts of Moreno, because the limited set of circum-
stances under which a stop and frisk is justified in Terry and the limited type
of search permitted in a Terry situation both come out of the process somewhat
the worse for wear. A "frisk" in an airport becomes something more than
it was in the Terry context; it would be a zealous police officer indeed who would
characterize a search inside a subject's pockets by an officer as a frisk. Further-
more, under Moreno a police officer need not fear for his personal safety to conduct
a search in the absence of probable cause. Finally, the procedures approved by
Moreno seem much more amenable to turning stop and frisk into "stop and fish"
searches, a transformation which the Supreme Court in Terry had hoped to avoid
by limiting the frisk to a patting of outer garments in a street encounter, and by
strict judicial examination of the reasonableness of a search in its factual context as
a means of carrying out the limited objective of immediate protection without fur-
ther intrusion.' 0
7But see Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972), wherein the Court said: "The
purpose of this limited search is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer
to pursue his investigation without fear of violence ...... The Supreme Court thus implied
that prevention of violence at a place remote from the officer's investigation is not an intended
justification of a Terry frisk, though it would justify a Terry stop.
8 475 F.2d at 49.
9Id. at 48.
10 LaFave, supra note 5, at 59. See also United States v. Legato, 480 F.2d 408, 414 (5th
Cir. 1973) (Goldberg, J., concurring) :
The exigencies of skyjacking and bombing, however real and dire, should not leave
an airport and its environs and (sic] enclve where the Fourth Amendment has
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What has actually occurred through the Moreno decision is that the limited
circumstances and methods of searches described in Terry have been left behind
in the rush to approve special police methods for airports. It is true that the
Terry decision stated that it did not purport to establish the limitations of protec-
tive search and seizure for all factual situations, and that such limitations would
be developed through future decisions.' Nevertheless, to say that under the
Moreno facts Terry allows more than a pat-down when necessary for the protec-
tion of "others" is to abandon all of the limitations which Terry imposed on
the use of stop and frisk.
The Moreno court recognized this problem and attempted to attenuate it by
characterizing an airport as a critical zone, similar to a border crossing, thus empha-
sizing the uniqueness of the airport situation and restricting to an airport context
the need to abandon Terry limitations. Of course, extending the "mere suspicion"
test of reasonableness for searches at border crossings to airports in general would
be an expansion of an even less desirable doctrine, from the standpoint of consti-
tutional rights, so the court declined to base its decision on that established legal
doctrine.' 2 What the court was straining to accomplish was to forge a new search
and seizure rule, applying to airports only, which permits warrantless searches of
suspicious persons, while purporting merely to be following established precedent.' 8
Perhaps it would have been better, in terms of safeguarding fourth amendment
protections, to use Terry as an analogy rather than controlling precedent. In this
way the court might have left the Terry restrictions intact while dealing with air-
port searches as a matter separate from police searches in general. But the court's
opinion did not reflect any extended concern over such theoretical matters; it was
primarily concerned with endorsing a procedure for searching possible skyjackers
during a period in which "law enforcement capabilities have not caught up" with
the air piracy threat.' 4
II. THE RELATIONSHIP OF Moreno TO EARLIER AIRPORT SEARCH CASES.
In considering the permissibility of airport searches exceeding a pat-down
in intensity without probable cause, the court had only a few cases on which
to rely as precedent. Virtually all of the legal commentary and cases which treat the
constitutionality of airport frisks are concerned with the constitutional legality of
the Federal Aviation Administration's (F.A.A.) anti-air piracy screening program.
Those cases turn upon the reasonableness of the screening process in which the
use of a behavior "profile" to identify passengers displaying behavior traits of
taken its leave. It is passing strange that most of these airport searches find narcotics
and not bombs, which might cause us to pause in our rush toward malleating the
Fourth Amendment in order to keep the bombs from exploding.
It has also been suggested that, in order to prevent the use of airport searches for the mere
warrantless detection of contraband, all non-weapons seized during a pre-boarding search be ex-
cluded from use as evidence in a court of law. See United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272
(5th Cir. 1973) (Aldrich, J., dissenting). See also People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d 603, 606,
219 N.E.2d 196, 198, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374, 377 (1966) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting), rev'd,
392 U.S. 40 (1968).
" 392 U.S. at 29.
12475 F.2d at 51 n.8.
18 But see id. where the court denies that it is attempting to substitute a suspicion test
for the Terry standard based on probable cause. Nevertheless, Moreno's conduct would only
be considered suspicious on a street, since the officer perceived no threat to himself. Thus
suspicious conduct becomes probable cause in an airport setting.
14 ld. at 49.
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a skyjacker, coupled with the use of a magnetometer to detect metal objects carried
by a passenger, leads to the frisk of a passenger who fails both tests. Moreno
devoted little attention to these cases, primarily because they add little to Judge
Weinstein's articulate analysis, in his opinion in United States v. Lopez,15 of the
constitutionality of those airport frisks carried out as a part of the F.A.A. screening
procedure. Subsequent cases, in which motions to suppress evidence seized during an
F.A.A. screening frisk were based on the alleged unconstitutionality of such a
frisk, have relied heavily upon the principal points of the Lopez analysis. Of the
several cases which the Moreno court cited as precedent for its interpretation of
Terry, only United States v. Lindsey16 deals with a situation in which an airport
frisk occurred without the use of the F.A.A. screening procedure to designate
persons to be frisked.11
The facts in Lindsey are somewhat analogous to those in Moreno. In that case
Lindsey had rushed up to the boarding gate four minutes before his flight was
scheduled to depart and handed a ticket to the agent, saying "save a seat for
Williams." The ticket was made out to "James Marshall," triggering the agent's
suspicion, so he indicated to the U.S. marshall standing at the gate that Lindsey
should be watched. The marshall noted that Lindsey seemed nervous and agitated.
When Lindsey moved toward the aircraft the marshall confronted him and re-
quested identification. Lindsey produced a selective service card bearing the name
"Melvin Giles." He then produced a social security card bearing his own name.
The marshall then noted two large bulges in Lindsey's coat pocket, and conducted
a pat-down search in which the the bulges felt "very solid."' Thinkifig that
those objects could be weapons, the marshall extracted them from Lindsey's pocket;
the objects turned out to be packages containing heroin wrapped in aluminum.
In upholding the use of the heroin as evidence the Lindsey court stated:
In the context of a possible aircraft hijacking with the enormous conse-
quences which may flow therefrom, and in view of the limited time in
which Marshall Brophy had to act, the level of suspicion required for a
Terry investigative stop and protective search should be lowered. 19
Thus the Lindsey court was moving toward the position advocated in Moreno that
an airport setting is a special situation, requiring different standards of constitutional
protection in order to facilitate anti-hijacking measures.
But even Lindsey is not sufficiently analogous to Moreno to support the holding
in the latter case on its similarity of facts. In Eindsey the defendant had cleared
the gate agent and was on his way to the aircraft when accosted. Moreno had
not yet begun the boarding process. Thus the urgency to conduct a stop and
frisk was much greater in Lindsey. More important, the Lindsey court carefully
distinguished its case from other stop and frisk cases in which the frisks produced
'6328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). This opinion also appears with an annotation
in 14 A.L.R. Fed. 252 (1973). Although concluding after a lengthy analysis that the F.A.A.
screening procedure was constitutional, the court excluded heroin found on Lopez' person
during the frisk because the character traits used to designate Lopez as a frisk candidate
had been altered by the local airline manager and did not fully conform to the F.A.A. profile.
16 451 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 995 (1972).
17 The other airport frisk cases cited by the Moreno court as precedent are United States
v. Slocum, 464 F.2d 1180 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.
1972); United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972).
18"451 F.2d at 703.
19 Id. It should be noted that Terry used the term "reasonable belief" rather than "level
of suspicion" as the test of constitutionality of a fri-k.
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only contraband which could not reasonably have been assumed to be a weapon
when detected during a pat-down search.
In United States v. Davis,20 for instance, a pat-down search followed by an
exploration of defendant's pocket yielded a roll of counterfeit bills. The Davis
court ruled the search void under Terry, citing the arresting officer's testimony
that he had had no particular reason, other than personal habit, for conducting
the search. It seems a fair inference that the court believed the pat-down of
that pocket must have indicated to the police officer that whatever was inside was
not a weapon, thus requiring him at that point to discontinue the search. In
Tinney v. Wilson 2' a pat-down search revealed something that felt like pills
wrapped in cellophane. The officer reached into defendant's pocket and found
illegally-possessed drugs. That search was ruled invalid because the officer did
not believe the defendant to be armed.
The Lindsey court emphasized that the marshall's search inside Lindsey's pocket
after the pat-down was justified because he had a reasonable belief that the solid
object he had felt during the pat-down could be a weapon. 22 But in Moreno,
Officer Granados had not formed, as a result of the pat-down search, a reasonable
belief that Moreno's coat pocket could contain a weapon. The Lindsey case would
thus suggest that the evidence should have been suppressed.
A case similar to Moreno did in fact rely upon Lindsey as well as Lopez and
Terry to suppress marijuana found in an airport search of defendant's coat pocket
during boarding process. In People v. Erdman,23 a New York state court held
that a bulging coat pocket of a passenger preparing to board an aircraft did not
justify a frisk under the Terry doctrine, since the bulging pocket would at most
support only a hunch and not a reasonable belief that the defendant was armed.
The New York court noted, however, that nervousness or suspicious mannerisms
which would alarm a prudent official might combine with the bulge to create
a reasonable belief justifying a frisk 2 4
The Moreno court devoted a substantial portion of its opinion to justifying
a lowering of Terry standards for stop and frisk in an airport. Indeed, most
of the recent cases dealing with airport searches express the view that the govern-
ment has a substantial interest in preventing skyjacking, and that airport searches
are an effective means of doing so This view is closely scrutinized in United
States v. Meulener,25 in which the court held that a passenger meeting the profile
is not on those grounds alone subject to a forced search. The court said that
before a search can be made a passenger would have to be told that he had
the option of declining to board the aircraft and of thus. avoiding the search.
A person declining to board the plane could be monitored by marshalls while
in the airport and become subject to a search under the usual search standards.
20 441 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1971).
21408 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1969).
2 2 See also United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. at 1098:
Even in the hijacking situation, any intrusion by a Marshal beyond the legitimate
scope of a weapons search is dearly unjustified and the fruits of such an excessive
search would be inadmissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding....
In this case the location and size of the object and the fact that it was tightly
packed and hard covered and that it was large enough to be a container for a pistol
or even explosive material gave the Marshall ample cause to require removal from
underneath defendant's clothing.
23 69 Misc. 2d 103, 329 N.Y.S.2d 654 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
24 Id. at 108, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 660.
25351 F. Supp. 1284 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
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But the special government interest justifying a search to prevent skyjacking extends
only to those persons who actually board the aircraft, and does not extend to
those persons who merely appear at the boarding gate but decline to board the
aircraft. To hold otherwise, said the court, would be to establish a special fourth
amendment standard for passengers at a boarding gate.2 6 Under the Meulener ra-
tionale, Moreno would not have been subject to a lower standard for a frisk
than that articulated in Terry until he presented himself for boarding and waived
his right to decline to board the aircraft.
The Meudener decision is based upon the theory that a warrantless search may
be justified if the subject voluntarily submits to the search. A passenger who
chooses to board his flight after being given an opportunity to avoid a frisk by
choosing not to fly is deemed to have consented to a frisk. This rationale is
more explicitly outlined in People v. Bleile.27 However, in Bleile, verbal notification
by the boarding gate personnel to the passengers of their right to not be searched
was held not to be a prerequisite to a finding of voluntary consent to be searched.
Of course, Meulener was not binding on the Moreno court.28 But it is probably
true that the Moreno court declined to follow Meulener because the Moreno court
wished to do what the Meulener court had specifically avoided, namely, to establish
a special fourth amendment standard for ticketed passengers at an airport.29 That
special standard is that once a person becomes a ticketed passenger in an airport,
he is subject to a forced search based not upon a police officer's need to protect
himself and others, but rather upon the reasonable belief that the person may
constitute a threat to other passengers should he board an aircraft.
III. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS: THE BALANCING TEST.
Having reviewed the Moreno decision in the context of precedent available to
the Fifth Circuit in deciding the case, it remains necessary to consider the inpli-
cations of the holding both in the narrow field of airport searches and in the
broader field of fourth amendment protections.
The debate over the constitutional validity of warrantless airport searches with-
out probable caibse has transcended the holding of Terry and directly confronted
the fourth amendment. But the fourth amendment does not contain specific prohi-
bitions; it only prohibits in general terms "unreasonable" searches. Thus a court
must determine whether or not a search is "reasonable" under the facts presented
when deciding on the constitutional validity of a search. The Supreme Court
has said: "Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness
other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search
entails."30  This balancing test is used by the Moreno court: "In cases such as
this one, where a warrantless search is conducted, it is necessary to strike a cautious
26 Id. at 1290.
27 33 Cal. App. 3d 203, 108 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1973).
28 In United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1277, the Fifth Circuit rejected Meulener:
"Moreover, [we] fully concur .. .that Skipwith's right-to-leave argument is devoid of merit.
Thus this court expressly declines to follow the rule announced in U.S. v. Muelener [sic]
29 The Moreno court does not explicitly limit its holding to ticketed passengers, but Moreno's
purchasing a ticket was a key element in the court's determination that Officer Granados'
belief that 'Moreno could be a skyjacker was reasonable. Whether that belief would have
been found to be reasonable absent the purchase of a ticket was simply not considered by
the Moreno court.
80 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
,[Vol. 34
CASE NOTES
balance between the competing interests of law enforcement and the right of the
individual to be left alone." 31
The courts considering airport searches are uniform in noting that the urgency
of the skyjacking problem requires special judicial consideration in balancing the
reasonableness of a search against the rights of passengers to be secure in their
persons, especially in view of the mortal danger to large numbers of passengers
threatened by a single skyjacker.32 Messrs. McGinley and Downs in their critique
of judicial decisions concerning airport searches83 note the willingness of courts
to construe Terry as requiring a very low standard of reasonable belief when ap-
plied to airport searches. As an extreme example of this attitude, they quote
from the concurring opinion in Bell, wherein Chief Judge Friendly stated that
he would have "no difficulty in sustaining a search that was based on nothing
more than the trained intuition of an airline ticket agent or a marshall of the
Anti-Hijacking Task Force."3 4  Thus the case law on this problem has been a
continual erosion of the Terry standards for a stop and frisk conducted in an
airport.35 A doctrine that began as a cautious approval of a frisk if used in
conjunction with a properly conducted and carefully restricted screening process
in Lopez now threatens to permit full searches of nervous-looking people who
have bulging pockets in an airport.
This possibility alarms civil libertarians, as well as a few judges. Judge Friend-
ly's comment so shocked his colleague, Judge Mansfield, that he wrote in a separate
concurrence: "If the provisions of the Constitution be not upheld when they pinch
as well as when they comfort, they may as well be abandoned."36  Judge Mans-
field's burst of indignation was echoed by the American Civil Liberties Union,
which recently released a position paper stating their opposition to both the present
system of searching all passengers and the screening system in effect when Lopez,
Bell, Epperson, and Slocum were arrested.3 7 In stating its view that "ignoring
the Fourth Amendment" in the context of an airport search is unconstitutional,
the paper observed that at the height of the skyjacking epidemic an air passenger
had a far lower probability of being involved in a skyjacking than of being present
during a bank robbery or of being mugged. Thus, the paper argues, if the air-
port situation requires emergency measures encroaching on constitutional rights,
81475 F.2d at 49-50.
3 2 A typical judicial statement of this principle is found in People v. Botot, 27 Cal. App.
3d 774, 778, 104 Cal.Rptr. 193, 195 (1972):
The content of the Fourth Amendment guarantee, however, must be shaped by the
context in which it is asserted. Here the questioning did not take place on a sreet
or in a park, but occurred in an airline terminal at the place where passengers were
boarding the plane. It is unnecessary to document the alarming increase in aircraft
piracies over the last few years. The dangers presented to innocent bystanders by these
crimes are apparent. When these obvious dangers are combined with the inherent
difficulty of preventing hijackings, an individual's expectation of privacy from ques-
tioning or search when boarding an aircraft should not be as high as in other public
places.
3 3 McGinley and Downs, Airport Searches and Seizures-A Reasonable Approach, 41 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 293 (1972).
34Id. at 315, quoting from 464 F.2d 667, 675 (2d Cir. 1972).
35 McGinley and Downs trace the gradual loosening of standards set by Lopez as necessary
to apply Terry to airport searches, through later cases scrutinizing the constitutionality of
F.A.A. screening procedure searches. Id. at 313-15.
36 Id. at 3,15, quoting from 464 F.2d at 676.
3 7 CML LIBERTIES, July 1973, at 6.
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cannot the same emergency measures be used in the streets of our. cities, given
the greater probability that a citizen may be mugged?
In concluding their critique of the cases McGinley and Downs state their belief
that "Terry can [not] constitutionally be expanded to cover the airport anti-hijack-
ing situation, and attempts to do so can only lead to a potentially serious dilution
of the protections embodied in the Fourth Amendment." 38  They go on to say
that public interest should not be permitted to justify a search of all passengers
at an airport, because to permit the reasonableness of a search to be determined
solely by reference to each new public crisis is to nullify the protections of the
fourth amendment.
However, since the cases cited herein arose, the F.A.A. has instituted a program
in which every passenger and every piece of luggage carried aboard U.S. aircraft
are being searched. Since the institution of this program in February of 1973
not one U.S. flag aircraft has been hijacked. 39 In view of the absolute success
of the program, it will be difficult for a court to rule it unconstitutional. The
compelling interest of the government in preventing skyjackings, the obvious effec-
tiveness of the measures taken, and the apparent lack of alternative solutions to
the problem, all combine to present a strong favorable ground of support for
the program in a court with pragmatic tendencies. Nevertheless, judges sensitive
to constitutional freedoms may have misgivings about the possibility that for the
foreseeable future each passenger will be searched before being permitted to board
an aircraft. It is not difficult to overlook or justify temporary measures to ensure
security during a time of conflict or unrest. But it is disconcerting to note that
this program does not envision an end to skyjackings, but rather assumes that only
the continuance of the program will assure that the skyjacking threat will remain
dormant.
IV. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS:
BORDER SEARCH STANDARDS APPLIED TO AIRPORTS.
It can be predicted with a fair degree of certainty that the court which upholds
the new universal search program will not be able to justify it on the Terry doc-
trine. To do so would require a finding that all ticketed passengers are suspicious
persons, each of whom can be reasonably believed to p6se a present danger to
the other passengers. Some other rationale will have to be found, and Moreno
suggests what that rationale will be. Moreno suggests that an airport be treated
as an "exceptional and exigent situation under the Fourth Amendment"; 40 that
an airport, "like a border crossing, is a critical zone to which special fourth amend-
ment considerations apply."41  Although the court declined to base its decision
on that idea, its discussion of the analogy suggests the availability of that doctrine
as a possible justification of airport frisks.42
38 McGinley and Downs, supra note 33, at 516.
8 9 NESWEEK, May 7, 1973, at 88.
40 475 F.2d at 48.
41Id. at 51.
4 2 The Fifth Circuit evidenced its intent to continue the doctrine of upholding airport
searches on the basis of Terry, but justifying the greater intensity of the searches on the
basis of an airport being a critical zone, like a border crossing, in United States v. Legato,
480 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973). Appellant was arrested after an F.B.I. agent opened a gift-
wrapped package he was carrying, having received a telephoned bomb threat, and found heroin
inside. In United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973), the Fifth Circuit
also stated that passengers need not be deemed suspicious to justify a search at a boarding gate:
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The significance of analogizing airports to border crossings is that border cross-
ings have long been recognized as a situation in which the general standards for
permitting a personal search may be lowered. In United States v. Warner,4 3 the
Fifth Circuit explains that the border crossing doctrine arises from a federal stat-
ute44 never successfully challenged on constitutional grounds, which authorizes a
customs officer to search any person whom he suspects to be carrying merchandise
subject to duty. Thus the federal courts have uniformly -held that border searches
do not require a warrant or probable cause, but that mere suspicion of possible
illegal activity is cause enough to justify a border search. Such a relaxation of
standards is said to be based upon Congressional recognition of the "peculiar and
difficult problems involved in effectively policing our extensive national bounda-
ries." 45 While a border search is not exempt from the reasonableness requirement
of the fourth amendment, the measure of reasonableness differs at a border crossing
in that searches which would be considered unreasonable if conducted by police
officers on a street might be held reasonable if conducted by customs officers at
a border crossing. An alternate statement of the justification for border searches,
appearing in numerous cases, is that there is reason and probable cause to search
every person entering the United States from a foreign country by reason of such
entry alone.46
Under the border crossing rationale, the Meulener test would be disposed of
easily. In United States v. Glaziot47 the Second Circuit held that the class of
persons subject to border searches was not limited to those actually crossing the
border, but also included persons who work in a border area, or who act suspi-
ciously near a border area. Applying this argument to an airport would negate
the Meulener requirement that only those persons actually boarding an aircraft
be subject to search.
V. CONCLUSIONS
It is probable that the usefulness of Moreno as precedent for justifying the
frisk of passengers not in the boarding process will be curtailed by the continued
use of the universal frisk program, the existence of which negates the justification
of a Moreno search on the grounds of urgency and extreme potential danger.
In moving to suppress evidence seized in a Moreno type of search today, the
In the critical pre-toarding area where this search started, reasonableness does not
require that officers search only those passengers who meet a profile or who manifest
signs of nervousness or who otherwise appear suspidous. Such a requirement would
have to assume that hijackers are readily identifiable or that they invariably possess
certain traits. The number of lives placed at hazard by this criminal paranoia forbid
taking any such deadly chances.
The court thus rejected yet another of the basic criteria of the Terry doctrine-that the person
frisked be suspicious.
But the Second Circuit has held that a person who does nothing suspicious in a boarding area
cannot be frisked on the basis of Terry unless he has met the profile and activated the mag-
netometer at the boarding gate. United States v. Ruiz-Estrella, 481 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1973).
43441 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 829 (1971). See also Annor.,
6 A.L.R. Fed. 317 (1971).
44 19 U.S.C. § 482 (1970).
45 441 F.2d at 832.
46 Annot. 6 A.L.R. Fed. 317, 323 (1971). A lengthy list of cases stating this rule appears
at the page cited.
47402 F.2d 8 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969). This holding was adopted
by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Hill, 430 F.2d 129 (1970).-
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defendant could argue that each passenger will be frisked at the boarding gate
before boarding the aircraft. Thus there is no compelling interest of the govern-
ment to frisk any passenger prior to that passenger reporting to the boarding
gate, unless the frisk can be justified under Terry as necessary to protect a police
officer and bystanders during an interrogation based upon reasonable belief that
a crime is about to be committed or is being committed. To relax the Terry
requirements in a Moreno search in, order to protect passengers aboard aircraft,
when the defendant would face a certainty of having his person and hand luggage
searched at the boarding gate anyway, would be to condone unnecessary infiinge-
ment of fourth amendment protections, since the Moreno frisk would be superfluous
in protecting passengers aboard the aircraft. The basis of the Moreno court's
consideration of the constitutionality of the search of Moreno, namely that "society's
law enforcement capabilities have not caught up with these problems," 48 is no
longer valid. While courts may well continue to justify frisks which take place
within airports, but which are not part of the boarding process, by citing Moreno,
the necessity for the Moreno decision is no longer apparent, nor the rationale
compelling.
Whether Moreno will become a useful precedent in non-airport situations is
a question to which any answer would be speculative at best. The Moreno court
was certainly emphatic in saying that its holding was justified precisely because
the encounter occurred in an airport.49 Although the ingenuity of courts in extend-
ing seemingly inextensible doctrines is enormous, it is to be hoped for the sake
of the rights protected by the fourth amendment that no court will find it expedi-
ent or necessary to determine that other situations in American life are analogous,
in terms of potential danger, to that of American airports in January -of 1972
when Moreno was arrested.
Robert Conley Kahbr
FEDERAL INCOME TAX-DEDUCTIBILITY OF COST OF ESTABLISHING MER-
CHANDISING OUTLETs-Briarc/iff Candy Corp. v'. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775 (2d
Cir. 1973).
I. FACTS; TAx COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS HOLDINGS.
Taxpayer, formerly the Loft Candy Corp., manufactured and sold boxed choco-
lates, candy bars, and other confectionary products. For many years it had marketed
its candies through retail stores located in cities throughout the northeastern United
States. In the late 1950's these urban stores suffered a substantial drop in sales,
as many urban dwellers left cities to live and to buy in suburbs.
To combat this loss of revenue, Briarciff transfered its marketing thrust to
suburban areas, establishing franchise agreements for the sale of its candies with
independent suburban drug stores. It created a franchise division that spent
$332,869 in the 1962 taxable year' to open and operate 159 such outlets. Of
that amount, $120,841 was allocable to recurring operational expenses; the remain-
der, $212,028, was allocable to promotional costs incurred in obtaining the con-
48 475 F.2d at 49.
49 See notes 40 and 41, supra.
1 Briarciff Candy Corp. is an accrual method taxpayer and files its returns on the basis
of a 52-53 week taxable year ending on the Saturday nearest June 30.
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tracts, such as expenditures for advertising, travel, art work, circulars, and salary for
the head of the new franchise division. The franchise contracts ran for initial terms
of one to five years with an average length of 2.4 years. These contracts were to be
renewed automatically every year after the expiration of the initial term, until either
party cancelled on thirty days' notice.
This franchise system proved so effective in restoring Briarcliff's income to
its former level that Briarcliff spent $4,152,249 to open and operate new franchises
in the succeeding years through 1968. However, increased administration and oper-
ation costs caused franchise profits to decline after 1966; and in 1969 taxpayer
decided to phase out the franchise program by cancelling each of the 1,640 fran-
chise contracts then in force as soon as was possible under its terms. In 1971
taxpayer sold all its intangibles and some equipment. In the sale the remaining
179 franchise contracts combined with all other intangible assets, such as customer
lists, manufacturing formulas, and goodwill, brought only $10,000.
These facts presented the issue whether the $212,028 of promotional costs
incurred to obtain new franchise outlets in 1962 was deductible as an ordinary
and necessary business expense pursuant to § 162 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954.2 In Briarcliff Candy Corp.3 the Tax Court held that the promotional
costs were not deductible, but were instead capital expenditures pursuant to § 263
(a) (1) of the, Internal Revenue Code of 1954.4 That ruling was based upon
the finding that Briarcliff's franchise expenditures resulted in the acquisition of
assets benefiting the taxpayer beyond the taxable year. And since these asseti
were not shown to have a demonstrably limited useful life, their cost could not
be amortized pursuant to § 167 (a) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 19545
and § 1.167(a)-3 of the Treasury Regulations.6
The court of appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the Tax Court. It held
that whether an expenditure could be expected to generate benefits beyond the
taxable year was no longer a controlling test, since certain other dearly deductible
expenses, such as advertising costs, can also produce benefits beyond the taxable
year. The court further held that the franchise costs were not capital expenditures
because those costs did not result in the creation or acquisition of a separate and
distinct business entity or asset. The court distinguished separate and distinct assets
2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162 (a) provides: 'Mhere shall be allowed as a deduction all
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any
trade or business .. "
341 P-H Tax C. Mem. 179 (1972).
4 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 263(a) (1) provides in pertinent part that no deduction
shall be allowed for "[ajny amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements
or betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate."
5 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(a)(1) provides that "[there shall be allowed as a
depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including
a reasonable allowance for obsolescence) ... for property used in the trade or business...
6 TREAs. REG. § 1.167(a)-3 (1956) provides:
If an intangible asset is known from experience or other factors to be of use in the
business or in the production of income for only a limited period, the length of which
can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, such an intangible asset may be the subject
of a depreciation allowance. Examples are patents and copyrights. An intangible as-
set, the useful life of which is not limited, is not subject to the allowance for deprecia-
tion. No allowance will be permitted merely because, in the unsupported opinion
of the taxpayer, the intangible asset has a limited useful life. No deduction for
depreciation is allowable with respect to good will. For rules with respect to organiza-
tional expenditures, see section 248 and the regulations thereunder. For rules with
respect to trademark and trade name expenditures, see section 177 and the regulations
thereunder.
19731
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
acquired through capital expenditures from other costs: a § 263 asset has been
acquired "if at the time it is furnished to the company, it has an ascertainable
and measurable value-that is, a value in money or a fair market value."" The
court held that Briarcliff's rights under its franchise contracts were so minimal
that the agreements served as mere conduits for normal sales to individual cus-
tomers. Since no property interests, "items of ownership of a permanent or fixed
nature which are convertible into cash," 8 had been acquired, or separate and distinct
assets had been created, no capital expenditures had been made pursuant to §
263. The court found that the'facts of the case
bring it squarely within the long recognized principle that expenditures
for the protection of an existing investment or the continuation of an
existing business or the preservation of existing income from loss or di-
minution, are ordinary and necessary within the meaning of § 162 . . .9
Thus Briarcliff's franchise costs were held to be fully deductible in the year in
which they were incurred.
II. THE UsE OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES FOR TAX CLASSIFICATION.
Both the Tax Court and the Second Circuit saw Briarcliff's franchise expen-
ditures as an outward and cash-flow sign of an inward and economic phenomenon.
Both tried to construct an account of this phenomenon that would expose the
true economic nature of the expenditure made, and thus provide a reasonable basis
for tax classification. The results were remarkably different. This divergence is
partly understandable, since courts attempting such constructions operate in a statu-
tory wasteland: the individual provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
and their correlative Treasury Regulations do not provide detailed economic or
accounting descriptions of those expenditures to which they are to be applied.
Hence, when an expenditure such as Briarcliff's franchise costs seems capable of
classification under two or more possibly conflicting Code provisions, courts rely
upon inner convictions and outside sources for the economic analysis and accounting
principles used to develop tests to determine the tax classification of that expendi-
ture. The problem becomes how to develop an appropriate test from several eco-
nomic and accounting principles, none of which are officially sanctioned by the In-
ternal Revenue Code.
Not even those accounting practices which are required for reports to federal
agencies other than the Internal Revenue Service control tax law classification. 10
But the pronouncements of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) are a fruitful source for criteria that may be advanced by litigants, and
accepted by courts, as the bases for the tax classification of expenditures. And even
if particular parties or courts do not expressly refer to these generally accepted ac-
counting principles, such principles often expose the economic and accounting as-
sumptions of courts more clearly than does analysis of the explicit language of
their opinions.
Accounting Research Bulletin NO. 43, Chapter 5, Intangible Assets (1953)11
7Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775, 784 (2d Cir. 1973).
81d. at 786.
9 Id. at 787.
10 Old Colony R. R. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 562 (1932).
11 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Committee on Accounting Procedure,
Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43, Chapter 5, Intangible Assets (1953).
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divided intangible assets into two groups. It provided that the costs of those
intangible assets whose term of existence is limited by law, such as patents, copy-
rights, leases, licenses, franchises for a fixed term, and goodwill as to which there
is evidence of limited duration, were to be systematically amortized over their
useful lives. These assets were called "type (a)" intangibles. The costs of assets
having no such limited life, such as goodwill generally, going value, trade names,
secret processes, subscription lists, perpetual franchises, and organization costs, were
to be amortized if at some time it appeared that those assets' useful lives had
become limited. Such costs might also be amortized at the discretion of the company
if it appeared that the asset acquired or developed might not continue to have
value during the entire life of the enterprise, even if there was no present indication
that the asset's useful life had become limited. These assets were called "type
(b)" intangibles. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides for a similar
classification of intangible assets in Treasury Regulation § 1.167(a)-3 and allows
amortization of intangibles whose useful life is known. Intangibles whose useful
life is not known, however, will not be subject to amortization unless one of
the statutory exceptions, such as those for organization expenditures under § 248,
trademark expenditures under § 177, and circulation costs under § 173, is applicable,
or unless the useful life can be estimated with reasonable accuracy.
The AICPA's previous division of assets according to whether useful life can
be calculated, still the basis of tax treatment under the Internal Revenue Code,
was superseded by a new accounting classification expounded in Accounting Prin-
ciples Board Opinion No. 17, Intangible Assets (1970) (hereinafter cited as APB
Opinion No. 17).12 The opinion considered four bases for classifying intangibles:
[1] Identifiability-separately identifiable or lacking specific identification.
[2] Manner of acquisition-acquired singly, in groups, or in business com-
bination or developed internally.
[3] Expected period of benefit-limited by law or contract, related to human
or economic factors, or indefinite or indeterminate duration.
[4] Separability from an entire enterprise-rights transferable without title,
salable, or inseparable from the enterprise or a substantifl part of it.-
APB Opinion No. 17 abandons the third basis, the previous AICPA position,
and adopts the second for use in future accounting practice. That practice will
be to
record as assets the costs of intangible assets acquired from other enter-
prises or individuals. Costs of developing, maintaining, or restoring in-
tangible assets which are not specifically identifiable, have indeterminate
lives, or are inherent in a continuous business and related to an enterprise
as a whole-such as goodwill-should be deducted from income when
incurred.14
This change means that analyses drawn from generally accepted accounting prin-
ciples will no longer provide direct support for the classification of intangible
assets for tax purposes pursuant to Treasury Regulation § 1.167(a)-3. Therefore
the utility of generally accepted accounting principles as a basis for advocating
tax classifications might be expected to have diminished.
Predictably, neither the Tax Court nor the Second Circuit mentioned APB Opin-
12 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Accounting Principles Board, Opinion
No. 17, Intangible Assets (1970).
18 Id. at 6663.
14 Id. at 6665.
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ion No. 17 in its analysis of expenditures for tax purposes. But both courts
paraphrased its bases of classification for purposes of economic analysis and, more
importantly, for tax classification. This de facto congruence of court-developed tests
for tax classification with generally accepted accounting principles suggests that
APB Opinion No. 17, in spite of its explicit differences from present tax law,
provides an implied gloss upon both Briarcliff opinions and a source for argument
in future, related cases.
III. THE TAX COURT'S OPINION.
The Tax Court assumed that all costs generating benefits beyond one year pro-
duce assets, and that the cost of acquiring any such multi-year benefit would there-
fore be a § 263 capital expenditure. The court overlooked advertising expendi-
tures, whose benefits often last beyond the taxable year, but which are almost always
held not to be § 263 expenditures. 15 Even if advertising expenditures were held
to create internally developed goodwill, that asset may be excluded by implication
from the operation of § 263: the mention of the cost of goodwill acquired pursuant
to the purchase of a going concern in Treasury Regulation § 1.263(a)-(2)(h),16
as an example of a capital expenditure, may distinguish such goodwill from good-
will created by advertising expenditures. And even if internally developed good-
will is a § 263 asset, or the multi-year benefit enjoyed by Briarcliff constituted
some other § 263 asset, not all expenditures made in respect to a § 263 asset
are capital expenditures.
This distinction shows up most clearly with tangible § 263 assets, such as
buildings. Treasury Regulation § 1.263 (a)-l (b)17 provides that amounts spent
to add to the value or substantially prolong the life of a § 263 asset or to adapt
it to a new or different use must be capitalized, whereas amounts spent for inci-
dental repairs and maintenance are not capital expenditures. Treasury Regulation
§ 1.162-41s specifically provides for the deduction of such noncapital expenditures
as ordinary and necessary business expenses. Therefore the Tax Court might rea-
1 5 An exception is Alabama Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 38 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 680 (1969),
in which the cost of signs used in advertising was held to create an intangible asset, an
advertising benefit, whose useful life was co-extensive with the five-year average useful life
of the signs themselves. Taxpayer was required to capitalize the cost of the signs and allowed
to amortize it over five years.
16TREAs. REG. § 1.263(a)-(2) (h) (1958) provides that, "The cost of good will in con-
nection with the acquisition of the assets of a going concern is a capital expenditure."
17 TREAS. REG. § 1.263 (a)-1 (b) (1958) provides:
In general, the amounts referred to in paragraph (a) of this section include amounts
paid or incurred (1) to add to the value, or substantially prolong the useful life, of
property owned by the taxpayer, such as plant or equipment, or (2) to adapt property
to a new or different use. Amounts paid or incurred for incidental repairs and main-
tenance of property are not capital expenditures within the meaning of subparagraphs
(1) and (2) of this paragraph.
'
8 TREAS. REG. § 1.162-4 (1958) provides:
The cost of incidental repairs which neither materially add to the value of the propety
nor appreciably prolong its life, but keep it in an ordinarily efficient operating con-
dition, may be deducted as an expense, provided the cost of acquisition or production
or the gain or loss basis of the taxpayer's plant, equipment, or other property, as
the case may be, is not increased by the amount of such expenditures. Repairs in
the nature of replacements, to the extent that they arrest deterioration and appreciably
prolong the life of the property, shall either be capitalized and depreciated in accor-
dance with section 167 or charged against the depreciation reserve if such an account
is kept.
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sonably have inquired whether before 1962 Briarcliff had first enjoyed the benefits
of a § 263 asset (property such as an effective retail merchandising system), and
had subsequently maintained or protected the value of that property by the ex-
penditure of the franchise promotion costs in such a way that no capital expenditure
pursuant to § 263 had been made.
If the Tax Court's assumption that taxpayer's franchise expenditures did create
a new or different § 263 asset is correct, then so is its holding that the method
of acquiring that asset is irrelevant for tax purposes. To pursue further the analogy
to tangible assets, the cost of purchasing a new building and that of constructing
one will both be considered capital expenditures. 19
Given the Tax Court's assumption that Briarcliff's expenditure had resulted
in the acquisition of a new or different § 263 asset, its choice of how to charac-
terize that asset for tax purposes appears to be based upon identifiability and period
of benefit, the first and third bases of classification discussed in APB Opinion
No. 17. By labelling the assets acquired as 159 valuable franchise contracts and
as new sales outlets, the court focused on the criterion of identifiability to support
its holding that the assets did not constitute unidentifiable goodwill. Rather, these
assets were identifiable individually, as contracts with individual store owners.
Their value could be measured on a contract-by-contract basis, and they were identi-
fiable collectively as the result of a new and different marketing campaign.
The Tax Court then relied on the third basis of classification from APB Opin-
ion No. 17, that of expected period of benefit, to hold that it is impossible to
determine a useful life for these assets over which amortization may be scheduled.
In some recent cases involving amortizability of purchased franchise contracts, cus-
tomer lists, and the like, courts have allowed statistical analyses of the average
life of such types of assets (in the hands of the purchaser or the seller, or in
the experience of the business or industry as a whole) as the basis for a reasonably
accurate determination of a useful life.20 The ensuing amortization made possible
by such analyses stands in contrast to the results of other cases, which suggest
that average useful life cannot be determined with reasonable accuracy by the use
of the statistical analyses offered, or that the assets acquired represent nondepreci-
able goodwill.21
19 Here is an instance in which a similar tax treatment of intangible § 263 assets would
conflict with generally accepted accounting principles pursuant to APB Opinion No. 17, since
that opinion provides that the cost of developing an intangible asset internally be expensed.
2 0 See Manhattan Co. 50 T.C. 78 (1968) (taxpayer's cost of purchasing customer lists from
another laundry service held amortizable over five years based on taxpayer's own previous ex-
perience of a 20% yearly turnover of customers in the same geographical area); Super Food Ser-
vices, Inc. v. United States, 416 F.2d 1236 (7th Cir. 1969) (taxpayer's cost of purchasing retail
franchise contracts subject to cancellation on 30 days' notice nevertheless held amortizable, based
on average duration of 86 months for such contracts in the hands of the seller); Securities-Inter-
mountain, Inc. v. United States, 460 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1972) (taxpayer's cost of purchasing
a mortgage portfolio held amortizable over eight years based on taxpayer's previous experience
in the mortgage banking business); Vaaler Insurance, Inc. v. United States, 21 AFTR 2d
558 (D.N.D. L968) (taxpayer's cost of purchasing an insurance agency and its expiration
files held amortizable based on a showing that policies had previously stayed on the seller
agency's books for an average of five years).
2 1 Thrifticheck Service Corp., 33 T.C. 1038 (1960), affd, 287 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961)
(taxpayer's cost of purchasing five-year banking service contracts renewable for one term held
not to be amortizable because neither the five- nor the ten-year terms claimed by taxpayer
as a useful life of each contract for purposes of amortization could be shown to be the dem-
onstrable average useful life of all contracts); Commissioner v. Indiana Broadcasting Corp.,
350 F.2d 580 (.7th Cir. 1965) (taxpayer's cost of network affiliation contracts for a term
of two years but indefinitely renewable held not amortizable over an estimated life of twenty
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This recent relaxation of the standard of proof for the demonstration of the
average useful life of a group of assets was not helpful in Briarcliff's case. Since
Briarcliff's franchise contracts were internally developed rather than purchased, no
history of the average duration of such contracts in the hands of a seller was
available as a basis for statistical determination of average useful life. And since
the contracts developed in 1962 represented Briarcliff's first venture into franchis-
ing, no history of similar contracts in the hands of Briarcliff was available either.
Given the assumption that Briarcliff's expenditures were capital expenditures
resulting in the acquisition of a § 263 asset, the use of the fourth criterion discussed
in APB Opinion No. 17, that of separability, might reasonably have resulted in
the holding that goodwill was created. Taxpayer's arguments against the claim
that the franchise costs created identifiable contracts even points in that direction:
In essence, the contracts required only that the drugstore proprietors set
aside and equip space in their stores for the sale of Taxpayer's products
and that they use their best efforts to sell such products. The principal
function of the contracts was to regulate sales when, as and if they occurred.
They did not provide for the payment of any fees or royalties to Taxpay-
er, nor did they require that the drugstore proprietors purchase any specif-
ic amount of candy, or for that matter, any candy at all. Those drugstore
customers who were satisfied with Taxpayer's product continued as good
customers. The others did not. The profitability and continuity of the
supplier-customer relationship thus hinged entirely on Taxpayer's ability
to provide the drugstores with products which would find continued ac-
ceptance with the drugstores' retail customers. This in turn depended
upon the quality and price of the product, upon the success of Taxpayer's
advertising and marketing programs and upon all of the other factors
which generally add up to a successful product. The existence of the
contracts afforded Taxpayer nothing more than an "expectation or hope"
that profitable supplier-customer relationships would develop and contin-
ue.22
If the value of the franchise contracts was so inextricably entwined with Briar-
cliff's success in maintaining customer relations, those contracts could probably not
be sold or assigned separately from the candy corporation as a whole and -still
be of any value. Therefore, given the Tax Court's conclusion that Briardiff's
expenditures did result in the acquisition of a § 263 asset, the criterion of separa-
bility considered in APB Opinion No. 17 could plausibly operate to classify such
an asset as goodwill inseparable from the enterprise as a whole.
Treasury Regulation § 1.167(a)-3 provides that goodwill is not amortizable
at all.23 Therefore, to characterize Briarcliff's franchise costs as goodwill would
years because each contract was unique and not subject to predictions based upon statistical
analysis); Dunn v. United States, 400 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1968) (franchisee's gallonage pay-
ments for the use of franchisor's Dairy Queen syrup under a perpetual assignment subject
to cancellation at any time held neither deductible nor amortizable, but held to be capital
expenditures increasing the basis of the franchise); Marsh & McLennan, Inc., 51 T.C. 56
(1968), af/'d, 420 F.2d 667 (3rd Cir. 1969) (taxpayer's cost of purchasing insurance expira-
tions held not amortizable in spite of statistical evidence showing an average useful life of five
years for similar assets in the hands of the taxpayer. The Tax Court held itself free to
disregard statistical evidence gleaned from the study of assets other than the ones actually
under consideration, and held that the purchase of the expirations was inextricably tied up
with goodwill.).
2 ZBrief for Appellant at 22, Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775 (2d
Cir. 1973).
2Tax law need not necessarily have developed in such a way as to disallow the amortization
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prohibit their amortization even if a demonstrable useful life for that goodwill
could reasonably be determined. Thus any characterization of Briarcliff's costs
as capital expenditures would amount to disallowing any deduction of those costs
through the depreciation provisions of the tax system, regardless of whether those
costs are said to produce identifiable franchise contracts or to produce unidentifi-
able, inseparable goodwill. Since these alternatives result in this same tax treat-
ment of no write-off of costs through immediate deduction and no deferred deduc-
tion through amortization, Briarcliff sought to avoid this unattractive consequence
by arguing that the incurring of the franchise costs resulted in the acquisition
of no assets at all.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS OPINION.
Tests for deciding whether expenditures create assets may be found both in
the Internal Revenue Code and in APB Opinion No. 17. The second criterion
considered in APB Opinion No. 17, that of manner of acquisition, assumes that
intangible assets may be developed internally as well as purchased. But it finds
internally developed assets, such as goodwill developed by an ongoing enterprise,
so difficult to distinguish from expenses, such as the cost of advertising, that it
recommends writing off both of them and treating only purchased intangibles as
assets.
The Internal Revenue Code, -by contrast, attempts to distinguish expenses from
assets according to the economic consequences that result from an expenditure.
The standard promulgated by Treasury Regulations §§ 1.263(a)-l(b) and 1.162-
4, characterizing capital expenditures and repairs respectively, considers addition
to the value of property, substantial prolongation of its useful life, or its adaptation
to a new and different use, to be economic consequences which characterize the
acquisition of an asset.
The operation of these economic tests is best understood in terms of opinions
that have construed them. A leading case is Midland Empire Packing Co. v.
Commissioner,24 in which the expenditure had been made to oilproof a basement
of goodwill. In Haberle Crystal Springs Brewing Co. v. Clarke, 30 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1929),
Judge Learned Hand held that a stipulated loss of $89,000 in damage to a brewery's goodwill,
caused by the anticipation and passage of prohibition legislation, could be depreciated over
the period in which the goodwill was lost. The schedule ran from January 31, 1918, when
passage of the eighteenth amendment became predictable, to January 16, 1920, when it went
into effect. The decision was reversed by Mr. Justice Holmes, 280 U.S. 384 (1930), not
because goodwill was held incapable of a decline in value and thus not properly the subject
of amortization, but because compensation for losses incurred by a business noxious to the
Constitution ought not to be made through the tax system, or any other agency, of the govern-
ment that prohibits the operation of that business.
In Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945), Justice Hand held that purchased
goodwill of a hardware business was amortizable, distinguishing the case from Haberle on
the basis of the illegality of Haberle's business.
While subsequent cases could have followed this permissably narrow reading of Haberle,
they instead adopted the reading of another brewery case. In V. Loewer's Gambrinus Brewing
Co. v. Anderson, 282 U.S. 638 (1931), the allowance for depreciation of a brewer's buildings
and equipment suitable only foi brewing was distinguished from the disallowance of deprecia-
tion in Haberle because the assets damaged in the later case were tangible.
APB Opinion No. 17 requires that purchased goodwill be amortized, for accounting purposes
at least. For arguments that purchased goodwill should be amortizable for tax purposes as
well, see Note, Amortization of Intangibles: An Examination of the Tax Treatment of Pur-
chased Goodwill, 81 HAav. L. REv. 859 (1968); Pearson, Is Goodwill Immortal?, 56 A.B.A.J.
60 (1970).
24 14 T.C. 635 (1950).
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used by the taxpayer for meat storage, against oil and water seepage that had
rendered the basement unfit for its former use. Holding that the expenditure
constituted a repair expenditure, the court noted that the concrete lining added
to the taxpayer's basement enabled the business only to continue operating as it
had in the past. Rather than prolonging the useful life of the basement or adding
to the value of the building, the repairs merely maintained and preserved the
value of the building. The repairs prevented the shortening of its useful life and
the lessening of its value as a business property that the casualty of the oil seepage
would have caused if left unchecked.
In Briarcliff the Second Circuit did not specifically apply these standards for
the characterization of expenditures made respecting intangibles, because of the
confusing state of present case law. But the court's opinion indicates that it kept
these or similar standards in mind:
[Tlhe changes which Loft made in its own internal organization to
spread its sales into a new territory were not comparable to the acquisition
of a new additional branch or division to make and sell a new and dif-
ferent product. Loft, in spite of its own talk about an additional division
and the entering into franchise contracts, was doing no more -than stimu-
lating its sales department to stem the downward course of sales by mak-
ing Loft's candy available in the suburbs to a class of customers who
had moved there from the cities where they had been purchasers of its
candy. It was selling exactly the same products it had sold for decades. 25
The analogy to Midland is almost inescapable. Customer migration to the suburbs
threatened the value of the merchandising system just as the oil leak hurt the
storage value of the basement. The franchise costs did not add value to the
system, but did "stem the downward flow" of sales-a finding supported because
the addition of the franchise outlets restored Briarcliff's income to its presuburban
level but did not increase it substantially beyond that amount. The opening of
the suburban franchises did not adapt taxpayer's business to a new and different
use, since taxpayer would continue to sell to the same class of customers, "exactly
the same products it had sold for decades."
The S econd Circuit did not rely upon this analogy as the ground for its holding
that Briarcliff's franchise costs were expenses instead of capital expenditures. But
the analogy may serve as the basis for rejecting the Tax Court's standard of bene-
fits beyond the taxable year as the test for whether a capital expenditure has
been made: the effectiveness of both Midland's concrete lining and of Briarcliff's
franchising system lies in the continued protection of the preserved business prop-
erty for more than one year.
The authority supporting the Second Circuit's rejection of the Tax Court stan-
dard, and the basis for the new test it described and applied, are found in Commis-
sioner v. Lincoln Savings and Loan Association.26 That case involved payments
by a bank into a secondary reserve fund to cover only those losses not already
covered by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. The payments
were required by federal law, and the reserves they created were kept available
to cover losses incurred in future years as well as in the year in which the payments
were made. In its holding that the payments represented a capital expenditure
rather than a deductible expense, the Supreme Court said that whether the payments
created benefits that the taxpayer would enjoy beyond the taxable- year was not
25 475 F.2d at 782.
26 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
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controlling. Rather the test was whether the payments served "to create or enhance
for Lincoln what is essentially a separate and distinct additional asset and, that
as an inevitable consequence, the payment is capital in nature .... 27
In Briarcliff the Second Circuit held that the test for what constitues a separate
and distinct additional asset, an asset whose cost represents a capital expenditure,
is whether "at the time it is furnished to the company, it has an ascertainable
and measurable value-that is, a value in money or a fair market value."'28  Sec-
tion 263 assets also have "an ascertainable and measurable value in money's worth,
so that they are no longer regarded as an expense but as a distinct and recognized
property interest."29 In addition, § 263 assets are those "items of ownership of a
permanent or fixed nature which are convertible into cash."2 0
This multiple-step analysis bears an interesting, if somewhat strained, relation
to the bases of classification offered by APB Opinion No. 17. A "separate and
distinct additional asset" may or may not be one which is capable of separate
sale pursuant to the opinion's fourth criterion, that of separability from the entire
enterprise. For instance, the taxpayer in Lincoln Savings and Loan Association
was not legally or practically able to sell its property interest in the secondary re-
serve fund without also parting with title to the bank itself.
The Second Circuit's definitions of "separate and distinct" are cast in terms
of cash value and fair market value. These definitions seem to make little economic
sense, since even Briarcliff's franchise contracts, if they could have been offered for
sale with or without the rest of the enterprise at the time they were acquired, pre-
sumably would have fetched some sum of money, and thus have had a cash value.
If all these allusions to fair market value suggest only that the fair market value of
Briarcliff's internally developed benefits cannot be ascertained before they are actual-
ly sold, then the Second Circuit seems to be adopting the second APB Opinion
No. 17 criterion for what constitutes an asset, the basis for accounting practice
ultimately promulgated by the APB opinion as its own basis for determining what
constitutes a § 263 asset-whether the benefits were acquired by purchase or de-
veloped internally.
Since all benefits purchased at arm's length by definition have a fair market
value (because they have been purchased), and since such benefits are recorded
as assets at their historical cost, this standard on the part of the court of appeals
does include all purchased intangible benefits in its definition of § 263 assets.
Therefore, half of the APB Opinion No. 17 second criterion, that which became
the basis of the 1970 change in generally accepted accounting practice, is satisfied.
A more difficult question is whether the court's standard, like APB Opinion
No. 17, excludes all internally developed intangible benefits from its definition
of a § 263 asset. The adopted standard did act to exclude Briarcliff's internally
developed intangible benefit from the court's definition of a § 263 asset, just as
the operation of the practices advocated by APB Opinion No. 17 would classify
the franchise costs as an expense rather than as an asset.
By adopting the fourth APB Opinion No. 17 criterion of separability as its
definition of a § 263 asset, and by casting its own definition of separability in
terms of the opinion's second, newly adopted criterion, manner of acquisition, the
Second Circuit has managed to recast tax treatment of internally developed intangi-
27 Id. at 354.
28 475 F.2d at 784.
9Id. at 785.
so ld. at 786.
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bles at least partly in accordance with present generally accepted accounting princi-
ples. But since this court's standard of what constitutes a § 263 asset is not
stated explicitly in terms of the accounting opinion or in language clearly equiva-
lent, it is difficult to predict how these new standards will affect tax treatment
of other internally developed intangible benefits. And the new tax and accounting
standards, even if identical in operation, were reached by different reasoning. APB
Opinion No. 17 provides that the costs of certain -internally developed assets will
be written off, because their value may not be ascertainable; while the Second Circuit
seems to say that anything whose market value is not ascertainable, because it was
internally developed, is not a § 263 asset at all.
V. THE EFFECT OF THIS HOLDING.
If tax treatment coincided exactly with the practices promulgated in APB Opin-
ion No. 17, it would not matter what Briarcliff's costs, or the benefits they pro-
duced, were called. As costs of an internally developed unidentifiable asset (good-
will), or of an identifiable asset with an indeterminate duration (the franchise
contracts), the amount spent would be deducted in accordance with the second
basis for classification of APB Opinion No. 17, the method of the acquisition.
And if these expenditures brought no assets at all to the enterprise, they would
be deducted as expenses.
But since the Second Circuit's test for finding that no asset has been created
may not apply to every internally developed intangible benefit, taxpayers will have
to look to the facts of Briarcliff to supply them with standards for their own
tax planning. Although not mentioned explicitly by the court, the analogy of
costs incurred for the protection and maintenance of income to costs incurred for
the preservation of tangible assets should be explored. The appellate court em-
phasized that Briarcliff's injured revenues were restored to their former level and
were preserved and protected through the sale of identical products to a similar
class of customers. Hence, taxpayers whose situations are similar to that of Briar-
cliff, but who sell a slightly different product or attempt to reach a different class
of customer through new franchises, might find their costs of developing a franchise
system distinguished from those incurred by Briardiff. Taxpayers whose revenues
were healthy and whose new franchise operations substantially increased their in-
come also might find their franchise costs distinguished from those of Briarcliff.
Another useful tax planning fact about Briarcliff's expenditures, never men-
tioned 'by the Second Circuit as a basis for its decision but apparent from financial
charts reproduced in the opinion, is that Briarcliff incurred its franchise promotion
costs over a period of several years. This spreading of the cost makes it more
closely resemble a yearly advertising-type expense. Taxpayers who have engaged
in a massive, single-year campaign to open a franchise division might -find their
claim for an ordinary and necessary business expense more difficult to uphold.
This new standard, with its tacit (perhaps only partial) adoption of the APB
Opinion No. 17 criterion for what constitutes an asset, will likely lead to profuse
and irritating piecemeal litigation. Numerous questions will arise as to whether
the fair market value of any internally developed intangible benefit is in fact as-
certainable at the time it is furnished to the enterprise. For the sake of simplifying
tax law, if for no other reason, it might be hoped that courts will adopt the
criteria of APB Opinion No. 17 as an explicit basis for tax classification in the
future. Such criteria would have disposed of Briarcliff with a minimum of eco-
nomic soul-searching, since the one indisputable feature of Briarcliff's franchise
contracts is that they were developed internally rather than acquired by purchase.
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If all internally developed intangible benefits were allowed to be expensed
pursuant to APB Opinion No. 17 practice, taxpayers would undoubtedly scramble
to develop, rather than to purchase, such assets. Ultimately, to avoid economic
distortion and to promote consistency and fairness, the amortization of all purchased
intangibles in accordance with APB Opinion No. 17 would have to be allowed
as well. The practical consequence of such tax treatment might be an undesirably
heavy revenue loss.
A brief look at the present tax treatment of intangibles in general shows that
the process described above may gradually be occurring already. Purchased assets
formerly characterized as inseparable from goodwill are now being called by other
names, as in the case of Manhattan Co.31 Not only were Manhattan's purchased
customer lists found not to be inextricably bound up with goodwill, but their partial
depreciation was also allowed on the showing of a statistically demonstrated useful
life. Intangible expenditures such as organization costs and research and develop-
ment costs have become amortizable pursuant to special statutory provisions. Now
Briarcliff has opened the door to the expensing of internally developed intangible
assets, including goodwill. These recent trends toward expensing or amortizing
costs for intangibles, which costs were never before written off or deferred, may rep-
resent a gradual shift of tax law toward the practices and standards promulgated
by APB Opinion No. 17.
Mary S. Lycan
FEDERAL INCOME TAX-PAYMENTS TO SETTLE A CLAIM ARISING UNDER §
16(b) OF THE SEcuRITIEs EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 HELD TO BE LONG-TERM
CAPrrAL LossEs-Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973),
rev'g 56 T.C. 1370 (1971).
In Anderson v. Commissioner,' the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit recently considered the question of the proper federal income tax
treatment for payments made to settle a claim arising from an alleged violation
of § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 The issue was whether
the payments should be characterized as ordinary business expenses or as long-
term capital losses. The Seventh Circuit resolved that issue by reference to the
rule of Arrowsmith v. Commissioner3 and to the policies and purposes of § 16(b)
and held that the payments should be treated as long-term capital losses.
I. SECTioN 16(b) AND THE ANDERSON FACTS
Under § 16(b), corporate officers4 who realize a profit from short swing trad-
ing5 in the corporation's common stock can -be required to pay that profit to the
31Cf. 50 T.C. 78 (1968).
1480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'g 56 T.C. 1370 (1971).
2 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)(1970) [hereinafter § 161i.
3 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
4 The stamts coverage extends also to directors and holders of more than 10% of any
class of the corporation's registered equity securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1970).
5 Defined as any combination of sale and purchase or purchase and sale, occurring within
any period of less than six months on which a profit is realized.
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corporation. 6 The purpose of § 16(b), as defined therein, is the prevention of
the unfair use of insider information; 7 however, to impose liability under the stat-
ute, no proof is required that the insider did use, or intended to use such informa-
tion unfairly.8 The statute's standards of proof are wholly objective and minimal;
liability follows automatically from a showing that the alleged violator was an
insider, as defined in the statute, and that he did engage in the proscribed trading.9
When a § 16(b) violation appears to have occurred, Securities and Exchange Com-
mission rules require the corporation to include details of the alleged violation
in any proxy solicitations thereafter sent to shareholders.' 0 These publicity require-
ments and the statute's minimal requirements of proof tend to encourage insiders
charged with having violated § 16(b) to arrange voluntary settlements.
In 1966, James E. Anderson was vice-president in charge of purchasing for
Zenith Radio Corporation. Some years earlier, Anderson had acquired 1000 shares
of Zenith common stock. He sold those shares in early April, 1966, realizing
a gain of $148,884.31. A few days later he acquired additfonal (and different)
shares of Zenith common. The price at which he purchased was lower per share
than that which he had received in the earlier sale. Shortly thereafter, Zenith's
legal staff informed Anderson that he had apparently violated § 16(b). Following
that notification, Anderson paid Zenith, in two installments, the full amount of
the corporation's apparent claim under § 16(b), a total of $51,259.14. No formal
legal proceedings had been instituted, although Anderson had been advised by
his attorneys that Zenith had no choice but to start such proceedings should he
not pay the claim. On his federal income tax return for 1966, Anderson reported
the gain from his April 1666 sale of Zenith shares as a long-term capital gain.
In addition he claimed the full amount of his § 16(b) payments to Zenith as
a deduction against ordinary income, treating those payments as an ordinary and
necessary expense of his trade or business as a corporate ex cutive and deductible
as such under § 162 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [hereinafter referred
to as Code].1 The Commissioner did not question Anderson's treatment of the
capital gain, but he determined that the payments to Zenith should be treated
as long-term capital losses, recalculated Anderson's 1966 tax liability, and assessed
a $21,897.64 deficiency.
In the early cases involving § 16(b) payments the Commissioner had success-
fully contended that public policy considerations required disallowing any deduc-
6 The text of § 16(b) reads, in part:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and
purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) with-
in any period of less than six moths, unless such security was acquired in good faith
in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be recoverable
by the issuer irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, direc-
tor, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or
of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months.
7 See note 6 supra.
8 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
9 See 2 L. LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 1043 (1961).
10 General Rules and Regulations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Schedule 14A,
Item 7 (e).
11 Section 162(a) provides: There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a).
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tion for such payments.' 2  That position was overruled in Lawrence M. Marks,13
in which the Tax Court held that public policy is not disserved and that the de-
duction was an ordinary and necessary business expense. In the immediate case
the Commissioner's contention that Anderson's payments to Zenith were long-term
capital losses reflects the current service position that the deduction, though allow-
able, is either capital or ordinary depending on the character of the stock transac-
tion giving rise to the alleged § 16(b) violation.14
II. JuDicuL RESOLUTION OF ANDERSON
A. The Tax Court Issues
Anderson petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination of the assessed defi-
ciency.15  In support of his treatment of the expenditure Anderson stated that
he had made the payments to avoid the risk that his well-compensated employment 16
might be jeopardized as a result of formal § 16(b) charges and to avoid the
possible adverse effect of such charges upon his business reputation. His basic
position was that, under the judicial gloss which has been placed on § 162 (a)
of the Code, payments made to protect one's employment and business reputation
qualify for treatment as an ordinary deduction.' 7
1. Mitchell Precedent
In making his protection of employment and business reputation argument,
Anderson asked the Tax Court to reaffirm the position it had taken in William
L. Mitchell,18 a case which involved facts virtually identical to those in Anderson.
The taxpayer in Mitchell was vice-president in charge of styling for General Motors
Corporation. He had sold General Motors stock at a long-term capital gain, and
within less than six months of that sale, he had exercised options to purchase
additional shares. On being charged with a violation of § 16(b), and faced with
the prospect- that the alleged violation would be publicized in the corporation's
next proxy statement, Mitchell paid General Motors the full amount of its apparent
claim. The Tax Court found that the payment had been made to avoid injury
to the taxpayer's business reputation and career, embarrassment to General Motors
and Mitchell, and expenses of potential litigation. Under these circumstances, the
court held that the payment was deductible under § 162(a) of the Code as an
ordinary and necessary expense of being an employee, the taxpayer's trade or busi-
ness.
The Commissioner did not directly attack Anderson's contention that the pay-
ments were deductible under § 162(a) of the Code,' 9 nor did he contend that
12E.g., William F. Davis, Jr., 17 T.C. 549 (1951). For a summary of the developments
leading to the Commissioner's current position on § 16(b) payments, see Nelson, Tax Deducti-
bility of Insider Profit Repayments: Resolving an Apparent Conflict, 24 CASE W. REs. L
Rlv. 330 (1973).
1'27 T.C. 464 (1956).
14 Rev. Rul. 61-115, 1961-1 CuM. BULL. 46 (1961).
15 56 T.C.1370 (1971).
16 In 1966, Anderson reported income of $173,332.14 as a result of his employment
with Zenith. James E. Anderson, 56 T.C. 1370, 1371 (1971).
17 E.g., Joseph P. Pike, 44 T.C. 787 (1965); Lawrence M. Marks, 27 T.C. 464 (1956).
1852 T.C. 170 (1969), rev'd, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909
1971).
19 The Commissioner's only argument against disallowing any deduction was an indirect
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
the payments should be properly classified, as an initial matter, as "losses" rather
than "expenses." Instead, the Commissioner argued that the Tax Court should
follow the Sixth Circuit's decision in Mitchell v. Commissioner,20 which reversed
the Tax Court, and should hold the payments to be long-term capital losses. In
its decision to reverse, the court of appeals in Mitchell was persuaded by the
contention that the rule of Arrowsmith v. Commissioner,21 as interpreted in United
States v. Skelly Oil Co.,22 was applicable and required treating the payments as
long-term capital losses, regardless of any business purpose on Mitchell's part in
having made the payments. In other words the Commissioner argued that applica-
tion of the Arrowsmith rule made it irrelevant that the settlement payments might
have satisfied the usual statutory tests for allowance as an ordinary deduction.
2. Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil Precedent
In Arrowsmith, the Supreme Court faced the problem of classifying, for federal
income tax purposes, the payment of a judgment by two individuals on behalf of a
defunct corporation. The two individuals had been the corporation's only stock-
holders and had caused the corporation to be liquidated in a series of transactions
completed five years prior to the taxable year in which the judgment was paid.
As allowed by the Internal Revenue Code of 19 3 9 ,2s the taxpayers had reported
their profits from the liquidation as long-term capital gains. After paying the
judgment, the taxpayers claimed the full amount of the payment as an ordinary
deduction. When the deduction was challenged, they relied on the principle that
each year stands alone for tax accounting purposes and argued that the payment
should be classed as an ordinary business loss incurred in the year of payment.
The Commissioner contended that the payment should be viewed as part of the
original liquidation transactions, requiring classification as a capital loss because
of the capital, gain treatment accorded the profits from the liquidation. The Su-
preme Court adopted the contentions of the Commissioner and held the payment
to be a capital loss. The Court further held that the annual accounting principle
"is 'not breached by considering all the [prior years'] . . . transaction events in
order properly to classify the nature of the [current year's] loss for tax purposes."
24
More recently the Supreme Court was confronted with questions similar to
those in Arrowsmith. In United States v. Skelly Oil Co.25 the taxpayer was a
corporation engaged in producing and selling natural gas. It sought to deduct
the full amount of refund payments made to two of its customers for overcharges
during preceding tax years. In those preceding years the receipts, which were re-
funded, had been included in gross income; however, in determining its tax liability
taxpayer had deducted from net income the natural resource depletion allowance
provided by the 1939 Code [now § 611]. In computing this allowance taxpayer
one. He contended that Anderson's fears of the possible consequences of not settling the
claim were unreasonable on the facts. The Tax Court dismissed this contention and the
issue was not subsequently revived. 56 T.C. at 1373-74.
2 0 Mitchell v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970) cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909
(1971).
21344 U.S. 6 (1952).
22 394 U.S. 678 (1969).
23 Section 115 (c) of the 1939 Code, the predecessor of 331 (a) in the 1954 Code, provided
that the proceeds from complete liquidation of a corporation would be treated as payment
in exchange for the shareholder's stock.
24 344 U.S. at 8-9.
2394 U.S. 678 (1969).
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had elected to use the percentage depletion under the 1939 Code [now § 613],
which for these years permitted the deduction of an amount equal to 271/2% of
.gross income from property." Thus the actual increase in taxable income attrib-
utable to the receipts had not been the full amount later refunded, but had been that
amount less 27 %.
The Supreme Court held that Skelly Oil's refund deduction must be reduced
by 27 %, the depletion allowance percentage; otherwise taxpayer would have
"the practical equivalent of a double deduction." 26 Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Marshall commented that Skelly was "really no different" than Arrowsmith,
which he cited for the principle that prior years' transactions may be examined
to determine whether a transaction in the current year gives rise to a capital or
ordinary loss.27 Then, in a significant step, Justice Marshall wrote that the Arrow-
smith holding, like that in Skelly Oil, is a "tax benefits" doctrine:
The rationale for the Arrowsmith rule is easy to see: if money was taxed
at a special lower rate when received, the taxpayer would be accorded an
unfair tax windfall if repayments were generally deductible from receipts
taxable at the higher rate applicable to ordinary income. The Court in
Arrowsmith was unwilling to infer that Congress intended such a result.2 8
Prior to the Skelly Oil opinion, Arrowsmith could be viewed as standing for
the proposition that the classification of a transaction which is directly related
to an earlier taxable event is the "inherited" capital or non-capital character of
the earlier event. Thus classification of the later transaction would in no way
depend on the actual tax consequences of the earlier one: if the earlier transaction
was "capital," the later transaction would be "capital," regardless of any favorable
tax treatment for the earlier transaction. This is a simpler view of the Arrowsmith
result than that advanced by Justice Marshall in Skelly Oil.
According to Marshall's interpretation the first effect of Arrowsmith is to place
an upper limit on the extent of the deduction allowable for the later transaction.2 9
Thus it matters not that the transaction might otherwise qualify for allowance
as an ordinary deduction 8° -the taxpayer cannot deduct 100% of an item when
that same item was earlier the subject of a special deduction (as in Skelly Oil)
or was earlier taxed at the preferential capital gains rate (as in Arrowsmith).
Given this limited extent of the deduction, the goal now is to balance the "tax
benefits" between the earlier and later transactions. The Court in Skelly Oil did
so by arbitrarily reducing the taxpayer's deduction; the Court in Arrowsmith did
so by "treating the repayment as a capital loss, rather than by disallowing 50%
of the deduction." 3'
Thus in Mitchell,8 2 the Sixth Circuit had held that Arrowsmith, as interpreted
in Skelly Oil, controlled the treatment of the § 16(b) payments in that case.
Noting that the Tax Court's decision in Mitchell had been made just prior to
26 Id. at 684.
27 Id. at 685.
28d.
2 9
"[T]he rule of the Arrowsmith case prevents taxpayers from deducting 100% of an item
refunded when they were taxed on only 50% of it when received." Id. at 685 n.4.
30 In Skelly Oil, the government and taxpayer differed over whether the deduction qualified
for allowance under § 162 or § 165 of the Code. The Court held that it made no difference
since !n either case the result would be an ordinary deduction. Id. at 684.
31 Id. at 685 n.4.
32 Mitchell v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970), rev'g 52 T.C. 170 (1969),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909 (1971).
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the announcement of the Supreme Court's holding in Skelly Oil, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that the Tax Court would have applied Skelly Oil and would not have
allowed the payments as ordinary deductions.
3. Holding of the Tax Court
The Tax Court resolved Anderson 3 by holding that the payments to Zenith
were made to protect his employment and his business reputation, thereby satisfying
the usual tests for an ordinary and necessary business expense under § 162(a).
The court expressly declined to follow the Sixth Circuit's reversal of Mitchell,
and by doing so signaled its intention to follow Mitchell only in the Sixth Circuit.
The court confirmed this intent in Nathan Cummings,3 4 a § 16(b) case decided
in the Second Circuit a short time after the Tax Court's decision in Anderson. In
Cummings, the Tax Court again expressly declined to follow the Sixth Circuit's
holding in Mitchell, and again held that the facts established the taxpayer's right
to deduct his § 16(b) settlement as an ordinary and necessary business expense.
The Arrowsmith rule requires the existence of an "integral" relationship be-
tween the transaction being classified and an earlier taxable event.3 5 Although
in Anderson there was such an event, the sale transaction, the Tax Court disagreed
that it was integrally related to the settlement. In Mitchell, the Tax Court had
concluded that there was an integral relationship between the settlement payments
and the combination sale-purchase "occurrence," 3 6 but not between the payments
and the sale alone. The court had offered essentially two reasons for that conclu-
sion: (1) the sale was a "completed transaction" 3 7-a transaction that had produced
a gain which belonged to the taxpayer, claim free,38 and one that, by itself, would
have led to no alleged violation of § 16(b); and (2) the taxpayer had made
the payments for an independent business purpose 9-for reasons other than conced-
ing his liability under § 16(b), a fact that "further divorced" 40 the payments
from any connection with the sale.
In reversing Mitchell, the Sixth Circuit had found it appropriate to apply a
S3James B. Anderson, 56 T.C. 1370 (1971), rev'd, 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cit. 1973).
34 60 T.C. 91 (1973).
35 See William L. Mitchell, 52 T.C. 170, 175 (1969); Mitchell v. Commissioner, 428 F.2d
259, 264 (6th Cir. 1970). None of the courts dealing with the problem of classifying § 16(b)
payments have differed with the principle that the basic Arrowsmith requirement is an integral
connection between the two transactions. Nor is there any evident disagreement that the earlier
transaction must have been a taxable event.
36 52 T.C. at 175.
3
7 Id. at 174.
3 8 In Arrowsmith, the suit against the corporation had been brought before the liquidation
was completed. That fact is not included in the Supreme Court report of the case, but
see the lower court's opinion, Commissioner v. Arrowsmith, 193 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1952).
39 The majority opinion in Arrowsmith was contained in four brief paragraphs, the first
of which was the Court's restatement of the facts and the last dealing with an ancillary
issue in the case. Spread through those four paragraphs are several comments, unelaborated,
to which the Tax Court's basic position in Mitchell and Anderson can be traced. Justice
Black had written that the taxpayers in Arrowsmith were "paying in their capacities as [trans-
ferees of liquidation distribution assets]," 344 U.S. at 9, and that it was "plain that [the
taxpayers'] liability was not based on any ordinary business transaction . . . apart from the
liquidation proceedings." Id. at 8 (emphasis supplied).
10 William L. Mitchell, 52 T.C. 170, 175 (1969). In Anderson, the Tax Court saw no need
to restate the position it had taken in Mitchell, but incorporated that position by reference
to its Mitchell opinion. James E. Anderson, 56 T.C. 1370, 1374 (1971).
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"but for" test for establishing the required integral connection, saying, "[e]xcept
for the sale . . . the alleged violation of § 16(b) and the payment .. .would
never have occurred." 4 1 In Anderson, the Tax Court rejected the appropriateness
of a "but for" test, reiterated its reliance on the reasoning it had expressed in
Mitchell, and offered a separate ground to support its conclusion, namely, that
taxpayer's capacity with respect to the two transactions had differed.42  While An-
derson had made the sale in his capacity as a stockholder, his obligation to make
the payments had arisen out of his status as an employee. On this basis, the
court concluded that Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil were both inapplicable "because
the payment was not directly and integrally related to the earlier sale transaction
...and because the status of the taxpayer in making the payment differed from
that which he had at the time the gain was realized." 4&
B. The Seventh Circuit's Holding
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the Commissioner again argued that the
tax benefits principles of Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil controlled and that Anderson's
payments to Zenith should be treated as long-term capital losses. Anderson relied
on the arguments with which -he had prevailed in the Tax Court. The Seventh
Circuit held that Arrowsmith, "with and without the benefit of its interpretation
in Skelly Oil,"44 was applicable, and that the payments should be classified as
long-term capital losses. As the Sixth Circuit had done in Mitchell, the Seventh
Circuit found the taxpayer's business purposes irrelevant in determining whether
the rule of Arrowsmith applied. The court decided that the payments were prop-
erly viewed as a direct modification of the sale transaction, a return of "a portion
of the sale proceeds, an adjustment of the sale price."45  Having thus found the
required connection between the two transactions, the court said, "Since there is
hardly anything inevitable about whether the § 16(b) payments inherit the capital
nature of the sale transaction, we think the purpose and operation of Section 16(b)
relevant to the determination." 46 The court concluded that the purpose of § 16(b)
was to foreclose every possibility of profit from the proscribed transactions and
that allowing Anderson to deduct the payments as ordinary business expenses would
produce a significant "tax profit." 47  The court was "unwilling to interpret the
Internal Revenue Code so as to allow this anomalous result which severely and
directly frustrates the purpose of Section 16(b)." 4 8 On this basis, the court ordered
the Tax Court's decision reversed and the case remanded to enter judgment for
the Commissioner.
After the Seventh Circuit's decision was announced the question immediately
arose whether that holding would convince the Tax Court to reverse its position
on the treatment of § 16(b) payments. The Tax Court has indicated that it
will not. Following the Seventh Circuit's decision, the government in Nathan
Cummings9 asked the Tax Court to reassess its holding. The Tax Court did
41428 F.2d at 264.
42 See note 39 supra.
43 56 T.C. at 1376.
44 Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304, 1307 (7th Cir. 1973).




49 60 T.C. 91 (1973).
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so5O and reaffirmed its decision that the § 16(b) payments in that case were deduct-
ible as ordinary business expenses. Thus the immediate impact of Anderson is
restricted to the Seventh Circuit. Payments made to settle an alleged violation of
§ 16(b) are now not deductible as ordinary business expenses in either the Sixth
or Seventh Circuits. Whether the Tax Court will change its position in the other
jurisdictions must await further developments in Cummings and subsequent cases.
III. COMMENT
A. The Tax Court Position
The Tax Court's position that the Arrowsmith rule does not apply to the factual
situation presented by Anderson appears to be based largely on language in the
Arrowsmith opinion5 l-language which invites the inference that the result in that
case would have differed if (a) the taxpayers had had an independent business
purpose in the later transaction; or (b) their capacities in the two transactions
had differed. It is difficult to see that these ideas represent different principles.
In Anderson, for example, saying that the taxpayer had a business purpose in
arranging the settlement is really no different than saying his capacity in the settle-
ment transaction was that of an employee, and both observations are only different
ways of declaring that the payments qualified for deductions as ordinary business
expenses. Skelly Oil, however, says that it is immaterial whether the transaction
being classified qualifies for allowance as an ordinary deduction, given that it is
directly related to an earlier transaction which had produced a tax benefit. The
Seventh Circuit, therefore, was on firm ground in finding that taxpayer's business
purpose in making settlement was irrelevant in determining whether Arrowsmith
applies. The court, however, apparently did not recognize that the distinctions
based on taxpayer's different capacities are no different than the "business purpose"
arguments. The Tax Court had presented its capacity distinctions as a separate
ground for holding Arrowsmith inapplicable, and the Seventh Circuit responded
by discussing them as though they were separate-finding them only "unpersua
sive"52 instead of irrelevant.
The Tax Court's other ground for holding Arrowsmith inapplicable to § 16(b)
repayments is that such payments are not integrally related to the sale portion
of the combination sale-purchase transaction. This is a strained and artificial dis-
tinction and is likely to be regarded as such by the appellate courts. Denying
that the alleged violation of § 16(b) in Anderson did not originate in the sale
transaction is a difficult position to defend. The Seventh Circuit's response is
doubtlessly typical. The court said that "the Tax Court has given only dubious
conceptual justification for isolating the earlier sale from the payments . . . ;"53
that "the 16(b) payments were "inextricably intertwined with taxpayer's April 1966
transactions';" 54 that "[b]ifurcating the sale and payments smacks of artificialty."55
B. Under Arrowsmith-What Result?
The most striking aspect of the Seventh Circuit's analysis of Anderson is the
court's reasoning as to the result which follows once Arrowsmith is determined
50 61 T.C. No. 1 (1973).
51 See note 39 supra.






to be applicable. To place this part of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in perspec-
tive, it is useful to recall the positions taken by the Tax Court and Sixth Circuit
in their views of Arrowsmith. Those positions differed not only on the question
of the events that would trigger Arrowsmith's application, but also on the question
of the result that follows after it is determined that Arrowsmith should be applied.
Thus, in Mitchell, the Tax Court commented on the result that would have fol-
lowed had the court not declined to follow Arrowsmith: "[The character of the
gain or loss in the later transaction is determined by the capital or non-capital
nature of the gain or loss in the earlier one." 56  In other words, the later trans-
action would definitely "inherit" the earlier transaction's capital or non-capital clas-
sification, without reference to the actual tax consequences which had been produced
by the earlier transaction. In- the Sixth Circuit's view, however, the tax conse-
quences of the earlier transaction would be wholly decisive. Having found Arrow-
smith applicable in its analysis of Mitchell, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the
result was determined solely by the "tax benefits" implications of the two transac-
tions in that case-a position reflecting the Shelly Oil interpretation of Arrowsmith.
In Anderson the Seventh Circuit decided that Arrowsmith was applicable and
required looking to the earlier sale transaction to classify the taxpayer's § 16(b)
payments. On taking that look, the court presumably saw two things: (1) the
sale had qualified as a "capital" transaction; and (2) the sale had qualified for
preferential tax treatment. At that point it was possible to hold, in accord with
the Tax Court's view, that the payments were to be treated as long-term capital
losses because they had "inherited" the capital "nature" of the sale transaction.
It was possible also to reach a similar result solely on the basis of the "tax bene-
fits" version of Arrowsmith. In either case, it could then be said that the result
would have the additional advantage of comporting with the policies of § 16(b).57
The court, however, chose neither alternative. Instead, it framed its opinion in
language which suggests that the purposes of § 16(b) had been solely decisive
as to the chosen result. The court found "nothing inevitable" about the pay-
ments inheriting the capital nature of the sale transaction. To it the purposes
and operation of § 16(b), therefore, were "relevant to the determination."
Since allowing a full deduction would "directly and severely frustrate" those
purposes, a full deduction could not be allowed. Because treating the pay-
ments as long-term capital losses would complement the purposes of § 16(b) by
preventing taxpayer from realizing a "tax profit," the payments were to be treated
as long-term capital losses. From this reasoning, it appears that the court meant
that there was "nothing inevitable" in any sense about the result produced by
application of Arrowsmith. According to the prior views of Arrowsmith, if the
payments did not inherit the nature of the sale (the Tax Court position), presum-
ably the extent to which the payments could be deducted would remain limited
by the "tax benefits" version of the rule. If that were so, there would be no
need to invoke the purposes of § 16(b) as grounds for disallowing a full deduc-
tion. The possibility that the payments might be fully deductible would have
been foreclosed.
From its reasoning, it would appear that the Seventh Circuit applied Arrow-
smith not as a unified rule whose application would itself determine the result
56 52 T.C. at 174.
57 Such had been the position argued by the Commissioner-that while the tax benefits
principles of Arrowsmith-Skelly Oil required treating the payments as long-term capital losses,
such treatment would have the additional advantage of meshing with the policy and purpose
of § 16(b). Brief for Appellant at 20, Anderson v. Commissioner.
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to be reached but rather as an entree to the decisive step of invoking the policy
and purposes of § 16(b). Thus viewed, the Seventh Circuit's analysis is confusing.
For example, why should the court have felt compelled to invoke Arrowsmith at all,
if the policies of § 16(b) were to be decisive? Was the court suggesting that
Arrowsmith is a doctrine which, when applicable, allows wide discretion in fashion-
ing the result according to the court's views on the total "equities" of the particular
case? In a footnote, 58 the court suggested that, in different circumstances, it might
have considered treating the payments as something other than capital losses. The
court referred to suggestions in the literature59 that treating such payments as an
addition to the basis of the purchased shares might be the proper solution. The
court commented that it was not necessary to decide on the appropriateness of
this alternative in Anderson because the parties had not argued it and because
the sale and payments in Anderson had occurred in the same taxable year. The
latter factor made treating the payments as long-term capital losses the "most appro-
priate' '6 solution in Anderson. That observation implies that, on different facts,
the court might disallow any deduction in the year of payment, on the ground
that adding the amount of the payments to the basis of the purchased shares
is the more "equitable" solution. Does it also imply that other, unmentioned,
equitable solutions might be "most appropriate" in other cases?
C. The Public Policy Rule
The Seventh Circuit's holding that it was unwilling to reach a result that would
"directly and severely frustrate the purpose of Section 16(b)" is based on a line
of cases in which the Supreme Court developed the "frustration of public policy"
doctrine.61 Under this doctrine, if allowing an otherwise legitimate deduction
would have the effect of directly and severely frustrating a clearly defined public
policy, the deduction will be denied. The rationale of the rule is that allowing
the deduction of such items as fines and penalties would lessen the financial sting
of the sanction being imposed. Such a result is presumed to be contrary to con-
gressional intent and presumed not to have been contemplated when the income
tax laws were enacted. In the "public policy" cases, the Supreme Court has denied
the deduction of expenditures which fit into one of only two categories: (1) the
expenditure is itself prohibited by statute (inapplicable on its face to Anderson);
and (2) the expenditure represents a fine or penalty imposed for violation of
a statute. The solution by the Supreme Court in those situations has been, with-
out exception to deny in its entirety the deduction in question.62
In Anderson, the Seventh Circuit invoked the "public policy" rule to justify
reducing a deduction which had been claimed for an expenditure made pursuant
58480 F.2d at 1308 n.9.
59 Lokken, Tax Significance of Payments in Satisfaction of Liabilities Arising Under Section
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,4 GA. L. REV. 298 (1970).
6 0 To support its holding, the Seventh Circuit cited Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958). For a later review of the history of the "public policy"
rule, see Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
61 See Justice Douglas' comments in Tank Truck Rentals, 356 U.S. at 35, discussing the
need for caution in applying the public policy rule, and identifying only the two named
categories as those in which the rule can be applied without hesitation.
62The Supreme Court has never said that denying the deduction in its entirety is an




to a nonpenal statute-securities law cases, 63 the Commissioner,6 4 and a prior Tax
Court case 65 all say that payments made under § 16(b) are "remedial" rather
than "penal." The Seventh Circuit did not say or imply that it regarded Ander-
son's payments to Zenith as "penalties" or tfiat it was invoking the "public policy"
rule for that reason, although presumably the court would agree that those payments
were, in fact, nonpenal. Thus the Seventh Circuit's treatment of the "public pol-
icy" rule in Anderson, like its treatment of Arrowsmith, would seem to have
taken that rule beyond its prior limits.
D. A Rationalization
There is, though, another perspective from which the court's analysis can be
viewed. The central issue in Arrowsmith was whether the annual accounting prin-
ciple prevented looking to an earlier transaction to classify a later one. The Com-
missioner's position was that relating back was required, whether the transactions
occurred in the same year or not. Therefore, Arrowsmith can be read to stand
only for the principle that prior transactions must be "considered" to classify prop-
erly the later transaction. In Anderson, on considering the relationship between
the two transactions, the Seventh Circuit decided that the settlement payments repre-
sented a return of a portion of the sale proceeds. Thus viewed, the payments
did not fall within any definition in the Code. For example, though the payments
were related to the sale of a capital asset and though they represented a retroactive
adjustment on the price received in that sale, their amount was not sufficient,
when subtracted from the actual sale price, to determine that the sale, as adjusted,
had produced a loss. The court therefore looked to other principles to determine
how the payments would be treated. The logical source for such principles are
the "public policy" cases, which deal with subject of the tax treatment of payments
made pursuant to statutory sanctions. While those cases identify only two specific
situations in which their rule can be invoked, they also contain language defining
guidelines66 to be used for identifying other cases in which public policy can
be properly considered. Ostensibly, payments made under § 16(b) fit within those
guidelines. The public policy cases imply, but do not definitively say, that total
disallowance of deductions is the exclusive solution in cases where their rule is
invoked. Because of their silence on the question of discretion, disallowance of
the deductions in those cases can be viewed as nothing more than giving effect
to the purposes of the particular statutes involved. Because those Statutes were
penal, full disallowance of the deductions was appropriate there. However, §
16(b) is not penal. To give effect to its purposes requires recapturing, insofar
as possible, all the profits which the insider had realized from the proscribed trad-
03 See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp. 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943); Western Auto Supply Co. v. Ganble-Skogmo, Inc., 348 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966).
64 Rev. Rul. 61-115, 1961-1 CuM. BULL. 46 (1961) states the Commissioner's position
that § 16(b) is remedial:
Section 16(b) does not render the dealings of the insider unlawful or state that the
amount required to be paid to the corporation constitutes a penalty.... Section 16(b)
merely shifts the beneft of the insider's dealing to the corporation. It extends the
common law concept of a corporate officer's or director's fiduciary duty. The pur-
pose of the statute is to place the insider in the same position he would have occupied
if he had never engaged in the stock dealings.
6 5 Lawrence M. Marks, 27 T.C. 629 (1955).
66 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
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ing. Presumably this includes preventing the insider from realizing a "tax profit,"
insofar as that is possible. Treating the payments as long-term capital losses is
one way to prevent the insider from realizing such a "tax profit." That such
a rationalization is even remotely plausible, given the variety of questions suggested
throughout this discussion, is an eloquent comment on the ambiguities in the rules
the Seventh Circuit was applying in Anderson. Perhaps by straining those rules
beyond their previously evident limits, the court has, in the most graphic fashion
possible, merely emphasized the need for their review and clarification.
John R. Rosebrough
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SIXTH AMENDMENT-NO RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT
PHOTOGRAPHIC IDENTIFICATIONS-United States v. Ash, 93 S. Ct. 2568 (1973).
On September 21, 1964, a man with a small strip of tape on each side of
his face and armed with a pistol robbed a federally insured bank in Eustace, Texas.'
That robbery triggered the investigation and criminal process which resulted in
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Wade.2  The Wade decision,
delivered along with .Gilbert v. California3 and Stovall v. Denno,4 recognized that
a lineup is a critical stage of the prosecution at which the accused is entitled
to the presence of counsel. Unfortunately, however, the sweeping language of
these three cases has presented the courts with more questions than answers, more
confusion than guidance.
Recognizing the problems that the Wade decision has thrust upon those charged
with its implementation, the Court has recently taken upon itself the task of ex-
plaining just how broadly the language of Wade should be read. In Kirby v.
Illinois,5 the Court said that the right to counsel attaches only at post-indictment
lineups, and in United States v. Ash,6 the Court held that there is no right to
counsel at photographic displays even though such an identification procedure is
similar to a lineup. These cases neither overruled the Wade decision nor even
expressed dissatisfaction with its propositions. But the fact remains that neither
Kirby nor Ash was compelled by the Wade language; rather, a logical application
of the Wade rationale would suggest an opposite result in those cases.
United States v. Ash involved the robbery of a Washington, D.C., bank by
'United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 220 (1967). A female cashier and the bank
vice president were the only eyewitnesses to the crime. They subsequently identified Wade
at a post-indictment lineup.
2The prosecution did not introduce evidence at the trial as to the pretrial lineup identifica-
tion; however both witnesses identified Wade in court. On cross-examination, Wade's counsel
elicited evidence of the pretrial lineup identification. Counsel was not present at the lineup.
388 U.S. at 220-21.
a388 U.S. 263 (1967). A post-indictment lineup at which the accused was deprived
of the assistance of counsel was also involved in Gilbert. However, unlike the prosecution in
Wade, the prosecution here introduced evidence of the pretrial lineup identification at trial.
4 388 U.S. 293 (1967). As opposed to a lineup which involves the display of two or
more individuals before the witness, the Stovall case involved a showup. A showup is a
one-man lineup; that is, only one individual is presented to the witness for identification.
In Stovall, the Court refused to apply the Wade and Gilbert rules retroactively.
5406 U.S. 682 (1972). The Court reasoned that since the accused had not been indicted
at the time of the showup, adversary proceedings had not been commenced, and therefore,
no right to counsel existed at the identification.
693 S. Ct. 2568 (1973). A photographic display includes any identification procedure
where the witness is asked to identify a photograph of the suspect or to select one photograph
from a group of photographs.
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two men wearing stocking masks. Four witnesses observed the robbery, but none
was able to give the police a description of the robbers' facial characteristics. Five
months after the robbery, the FBI, acting on information supplied by a government
informer, showed five black-and-white mug shots, including a picture of Ash, to
the four witnesses. All four witnesses made uncertain identifications of Ash.7
Ash was subsequently arrested and indicted; trial was set for May 1968, almost
three years after the crime. Less than twenty-four hours before trial, the four
eyewitnesses were shown five color photographs, including one of Ash; only three
of the witnesses were able to identify Ash. a At trial, all four witnesses made
in-court identifications of Ash, but only one of these witnesses was "positive" of
her identification.9 Over the objections of defense counsel, the prosecution intro-
duced evidence of the recent pretrial photographic identifications. Ash was con-
victed and appealed on the ground that he was deprived of counsel at the post-
indictment photographic display. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia recognized the similarities between a lineup and a photographic display
and reversed the conviction on the theory that the Wade requirement of the pres-
ence of counsel at lineups also applied to photographic displays.10 A petition
for writ of certiorari was filed to determine the applicability of Wade.
The Wade opinion was concerned with the reliability of eyewitness identifica-
tion. Since this form of identification is present in both lineups and photographic
displays, the Wade opinion would appear to have precedential value in resolving
the controversy in Ash. But the Ash Court chose to limit Wade to its facts
rather than to extend it to photographic displays.
The purpose of this casenote is to analyze the inconsistency between the Wade
and Ash opinions. It is suggested that difficulties may arise in the criminal process
as a result of the existence of two standards to control the admission of eyewitness
identification-one for lineups, another for photographic displays.
In dissenting from the majority opinion in Ash, Mr. Justice Brennan concluded
that, given the Wade decision, there was no logical justification for the Ash result.
He saw the Ash opinion as a "complete evisceration of the fundamental constitu-
tional principles . . ." established in the lineup cases." Regardless of the validity
of this reading of Ash, it is important to examine the Court's justification for
refusing to extend the Wade rationale to photographic displays. In contrasting
Wade and Ash, it is easy to conclude that the -latter decision is unsound since
it post-dated the Wade opinion and therefore created the inconsistency. It will
be seen herein, however, that Wade may have been the decision which deviated
from constitutional principles. If this is the case, the only defect of Ash would
be that it failed to overrule Wade.
Undoubtedly the easiest explanation for the inconsistency in the eyewitness iden-
tification cases can be found in a recognition of the composition of the Court
when Wade, Kirby and Ash were decided.' 2  The decisions in Wade, (ilbert, and
Stovall were handpd down on June 12, 1967. By the time Kirby and Ash were
71d. at 2570.
8Id.
9Id. at 2582 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
10 United States v. Ash, 461 F.2d 92, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
11Id. at 2582 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1 -Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist and Marshall, JJ., took part in the
Ash decision but were not on the Court at the time of Wade. Of the five judges who
left the Court between the Wade decision and the Ash decision, four (Black, Fortas, Clark,
JJ., and Warren, C.J.,) concurred in the Court's holding that a lineup was a critical stWg
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decided, five new members, each with his own philosophy and values, had been
added to the Court. The easy conclusion is that the shift in membership also
produced a shift in the law. But such a conclusion ignores the well settled princi-
ples of stare decisis and judicial continuity, and suggests that the Court decides
cases based on mere opinion rather than an examination of the Constitution and
prior Supreme Court interpretations. 13 Therefore, it is necessary to analyze and
critically evaluate the Ash opinion. Such an analysis naturally begins with a look
to United States v. Wade.
I. UNITED STATES V. WADE AND THE DANGERS
OF IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE
The sixth amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense.14 Numerous Supreme Court decisions have
held that this right entitles an accused to representation not only at the trial but
also at all "critical stages" of the proceeding. 15 A critical stage has been defined
as "any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where coun-
sel's absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial- u 6
Like Ash, the Wade case involved a bank robbery. An indictment was re-
turned against Billy Joe Wade approximately six months after the crime had been
committed. Wade was arrested and counsel appointed for him. Fifteen days after
the appointment of counsel, an FBI agent, without notice to Wade's lawyer, ar-
ranged to have two bank employees observe a lineup made up of Waae and five
or six other prisoners. Both bank employees identified Wade at the lineup.' 7
At trial, the prosecution made no reference to the pretrial lineup but asked
the two bank employees to identify Wade in court. Both did so. On cross-
examination, defense counsel brought out the fact that a pretrial lineup had been
conducted in the absence of counsel and this became the basis of Wade's appeal.
The question before the Court in Wade was whether a pretrial, post-indictment
lineup was a sufficiently critical stage of the proceeding for the right to counsel
to attach. Answering affirmatively, the Court dedicated ten full pages of its opinion
to a discussion of the dangers inherent in eyewitness identification.' 8 In the words
of the Court, "identification evidence is peculiarly riddled with innumerable dan-
of the criminal process at which the accused were entitled to the assistance of counsel. The
fifth Justice (Harlan, J.) dissented from that holding.
13See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 652 (1895) where Mr.
Justice White wrote in his dissenting opinion:
The fundamental conception of a judicial body is that of one hedged about by prece-
dents which are binding on the court without regard to the personalities of its mem-
bers. Break down this belief in judicial continuity, and let it be felt that on great
constitutional questions this court is to depart from the settled conclusions of its
predecessors, and to determine them all according to the mere opinion of those who
temporarily fill its bench, and our Constitution will, in my judgment, be bereft of
value and become a most dangerous instrument to the rights and liberties of the
people.
14 U. S. CON T. amend. VI.
15See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52
(1961); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). All of these cases involved a pretrial
confrontation which the Court determined to be a critical stage of the proceedings.
16United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967).
17 Id. at 220.
Is Id. at 228-39.
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gers and variable factors which might seriously, even crucially, derogate from a
fair trial."' 9
The unreliability of eyewitness identification had led Mr. Justice Frankfurter
many years ago to ask:
What is the worth of identification testimony even when uncontradicted?
The identification of strangers is proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards
of such testimony are established by a formidable number of instancesin the records of English and American trials. These instances are recent
-not due to the brutalities of ancient criminal procedure.2 o
The Wade opinion was the first attempt by the Court to establish effective con-
stitutional safeguards and rules governing the use of eyewitness identification in
federal and state criminal trials.21 Implicit in the decision was a recognition that
an accused's guilt or innocence is often determined for all practical purposes at
the lineup.22 The subsequent trial becomes merely a rubber-stamp of the witness's
pretrial identification.
Two observations predominate throughout the Wade opinion. First, the Court
repeatedly recognized that there is grave potential for prejudice in a pretrial line-
up.2 3 This potential for prejudice is the product of normal human inaccuracy
in observation and improper police identification procedures.2 4 Furthermore, the
Court noted that a pretrial identification has a certain "freezing effect" on the
witness's perception of the guilty party. The Court stated that "it is a matter
of common experience that once a witness has picked out the accused at the lineup,
he is not likely to go back on his word later on, so that in practice the issue
of identity may (in the absence of other relevant evidence) for all practical purposes
be determined then and there, before trial."2 5
The second observation underlying the Wade opinion is that the prejudice
which may result at a pretrial identification is difficult to reconstruct at trial.26
If counsel is not present to observe the conduct of the pretrial lineup, he will
be unable to cross-examine adequately the witness at trial. With little opportunity
to impeach the heavily weighted and often inaccurate eyewitness identification, the
accused is deprived of his fundamental right to a fair trial.27
Therefore, the Wade majority characterized the pretrial lineup as a critical
19 Id. at 228.
2 0 F. FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZEMn 30 (1927). This passage
is also quoted in Wade, 388 U.S. at 228.
21 N. SOBEL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION 2 (1972).
22 388 U.S. at 229; Williams and Hammelmann, Identification Parades-I, 1963 CRIM.
L. REV. 479, 482. See also United States v. Collins, 416 F.2d 696, 701 (4th Cir. 1969)
(Winter, J., dissenting).
23 388 U.S. at 236.
24See P. WALL, EYE-WITNESs IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 214 (1971) where
the author summarizes the causes of eyewitness identification dangers:
... the normal human fallibilities of perception and memory, improper and suggestive
identification procedures employed by the police, a general unawareness of the dangers
of identification evidence on the part of jurors, and the failure of the criminal process
to provide adequate measures to combat these deficiencies.
25 388 U.S. at 229.
261d. at 231-32. See also United States ex rel. Reed v. Anderson, 461 F.2d 739, 742
(3rd Cir. 1972) which deals with the difficulty of reconstructing photographic identifications:
Recurring through Wade is the Court's concern over the difficulty of reconstructing
with fairness and accuracy what actually took place at the lineup or showup ....
27 388 U.S. at 224.
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stage of the criminal proceedings because of the substantial prejudice which inheres
in a lineup identification and the need for enhancing counsel's ability to avoid
that prejudice. Furthermore, the Court fashioned an exclusionary rule prohibiting
the introduction of any evidence obtained at a lineup at which the accused is
deprived of his right to counseL28 The Court also barred the introduction of
any in-court identification which was preceded by a lineup at which the accused
was deprived of counsel unless the prosecution produces clear and convincing evi-
dence that the in-court identification was not tainted by the prior lineup. 29
The difficulty and confusion created by the Wade opinion does not arise from
its discussion of the problems inherent in eyewitness identifications, but rather from
its proposed solution to those problems. The Wade Court was concerned with
the prejudicial suggestion and difficulty of reconstruction which accompany a lineup
identification. However, instead of directly attacking these weaknesses in eyewitness
identifications, the Court opted for assigning counsel the duty to protect against
these dangers. As an alternative to recognizing a right to counsel at lineups,
the Court could have prescribed specific procedures that police would be required
to follow before any lineup identification could be introduced at trial. Admittedly,
it would be more difficult for the Court to propose detailed standards which would
define the requirements of due process; nevertheless, such an approach to the prob-
lem would be more consistent with the major concerns of the opinion. When
the Court prescribed the right to counsel as the solution to the weakness inherent
in eyewitness identification, it directed its focus away ,from the principal issue in
the case. Thus, it camouflaged its reasoning and encouraged those who must im-
plement the Wade decision to concentrate on "critical stage" concepts and the
right to the assistance of counsel rather than the dangers of eyewitness identifica-
tion.8 0
Moreover, at one point in the opinion the majority suggests that a lineup
might not be considered a "critical" stage of the proceedings if there were pub-
lished guidelines regarding the proper conduct of a lineup.31 The Court says:
Legislative or other regulations, such as those of local police departments,
which eliminate the risks of abuse and unintentional suggestion at lineup
proceedings and the impediments to meaningful confrontation at trial
may also remove the basis for regarding the stage as "critical." But
neither Congress nor the federal authorities has seen fit to provide a solu-
tion. What we hold today "in no way creates a constitutional strait-
jacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to
have that effect." 32
In this passage, the Court seems to suggest that certain standardized procedures,
28 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263,273 (1967).
29 388 U.S. at 240.
30 The dissenting opinion in Wlade suggests that the unreliability of eyewitness identification
was not the only concern of the Court:
The Court apparently believes that improper police procedures are so widespread
that a broad prophylactic rule must be laid down, requiring the presence of counsel
at all pretrial identifications in order to detect recurring instances of police misconduct.
Id. at 251-52 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). This view perhaps has led those who
share Mr. Justice White's trust in police officers to refuse to extend the Wade opinion to
its natural limits. See 7 WAKB FoREsT L. Rlv. 333, 337 (1971) where the author uses
this rationale to explain a decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court, State v. Accor,
277 N.C. 65, 175 S.E.2d 583 (1970).




perhaps including videotaping or otherwise recording the lineup event, might ex-
tinguish the need for counsel at a lineup.
In other words, when the Wade Court selected the sixth amendment as the
vehicle to remedy the problems of eyewitness identification, it superimposed upon
the identification issue a whole body of law pertaining to right to counsel cases.
It thereby permitted the Ash Court to distinguish Ash from Wade on right to
counsel grounds, effectively undermining the basic concern of both cases: the dan-
gers inherent in eyewitness identification.
The Wade reasoning was deficient not just because of its oversimplified solu-
tion to the problems of eyewitness testimony, but also because it failed to establish
any criteria which would define the means that an attorney could employ to insure
a fair lineup.83  The accused's counsel was given no--indication as to what role
he should play at a lineup. Therefore the Court could not guarantee that the
presence of counsel at a lineup would guard against all the identification dangers
which it considered in its opinion. Certainly a more direct, due process approach
to the problems that plagued the Court in Wade would have generated less confu-
sion in the area of eyewitness identification and would have been more consistent
with earlier Supreme Court decisions.8 4
It is true that Wade involved a post-indictment lineup, not a photographic
display. But the broad language and repeated references to the dangers of eye-
witness identification led many to speculate that a photographic display was just
as critical, for sixth amendment purposes, as a lineup. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court refused to grant certiorari to answer such speculation until more than six
years had elapsed. 35 In those six years there was near unanimity among commenta-
tors in favor of the extension of the Wade rationale to photographic displays.36
On the other hand, the contrary opinion was voiced by nine of the ten circuits
which had considered the issue.37 At the time of Ash, only the Court of Appeals
33 388 U.S. at 259 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). See N. SOBEL, EYE-WITNESS
IDENTIFICATION 115 (1972); Comment, Extension of The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
-The Road from Wade to Ash, 7 U. RicH. L. REv. 139, 148 (1972).
By failing to specifically delineate the function of the lawyer at the lineup, the Su-
preme Court's decision not only made the role of counsel at a lineup proceeding am-biguous, but also had the ultimate effect of fostering the implicit suggestion that
presence of counsel may be remedial in areas of pretrial procedure only vaguely simi-
lar to the lineup itself.
Id. at 148.
84 See cases cited note 12 supra.
3 5 See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 416 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1025 (1970); United States v. Robinson, 406 F.2d 64 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 926 (1969); People v. Lawrence, 4 Cal.3d 273, 481 P.2d 212 (1971), cert. denied,
407 U.S. 909 (1972).
3 6 See, e.g., Quinn, In the Wake of Wade: The Dimensions of the Eyewitness' Identification
Cases, 42 COLO. L. REv. 135 (1970); Sobel, Assailing the Impermissable Suggestion, Evolving
Limitations on the Abuse of Pre-Trial Identification Methods, 38 BROOK. L. REv. 261 (1971);
Comment, Photo Identifications: A Right to Counsel?, 7 CALIF. WEST. L. REV. 161 (1970);
The Supreme Court 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REV. 69, 181-82 (1967); Comment, Extension
of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel-The Road from Wade to Ash, 7 U. RICH.
L. REV. 139 (1972); 41 FORD. L. REv. 149 (1972); 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1019 (1968); 44
TE-P. L. Q. 434 (1971); 16 VILL. L. REV. 741 (1971); 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 333
(1971).
37United States v. Serio, 440 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. Long, 449
F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 974 (1972, Allen v. Rhay, 431 F.2d
1160 (9th Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Reed v. Anderson, 461 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1970);
United States v. Ballard, 423 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d
888 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 852 (1969); United States v. Collins, 416 1.2d
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for the District of Columbia had chosen to extend the right to counsel to photo-
graphic displays.38
Those who suggested that the Wade opinion should not be limited to lineups,
but should also be read to include photographic displays, based their reasoning
on the extensive similarities between the two identification processes. Both lineups
and photographic displays are directed towards eyewitness identification; both are
laden with the possibilities of prejudicial suggestion; and both are difficult to re-
construct at trial.3 9 Since these factors were the major concern of the Wade Court,
writers concluded that the right to counsel should also attach to photographic dis-
plays. Any other conclusion, they believed would conflict with the clear language
of Wade.
But courts, on the other hand, have generally refused to recognize a right
to counsel at photographic displays.40 To justify this refusal to apply Wade, courts
have resorted to two distinct arguments. Some have said that since the accused
is not present at a photographic display, there is no confrontation and, therefore,
no right to counsel. 41 Others have held that any prejudice which might inhere
in a photographic display can be brought out at trial since, in most instances,
the photographs could be examined by the accused's counsel. 42 Therefore, the
reconstruction difficulty which bothered the Wade Court would be no problem
at photographic displays.
This was the state of the law when the Supreme Court finally granted certiorari
to resolve the controversial issue.43 In the six years that followed Wade, the
applicability of the right to counsel to photographic displays had been heatedly
debated. All arguments on both sides of the question had been raised, and it
was left for the Court to choose among them.
696 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1025 (1970); United States v. Robinson, 406
F.2d 64 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 926 (1969); United States v. Conway, 415
F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1969); Rech v. United States, 410 F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1969); McGee
v. United States, 402 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1969).
The majority of state courts have agreed that there is no right to counsel at photographic
displays. See, e.g., People v. Martin, 47 Ill. 2d 331, 265 N.E.2d 685 (1970); Commonwealth
v. Geraway, 355 Mass. 433, 245 N.E.2d 423 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 911 (1969).
However a few state courts have granted the right to counsel at photographic displays. These
courts have based their reasoning on the Wade opinion. See, e.g., Th~mpson v. State, 85
Nev. 134, 451 P.2d 704 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 983 (1969); Cox v. State, 219 So.
2d, 762, 765 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969).
38 United States v. Ash, 461 F.2d 92 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The only other court of appeals
decision which recognized the right to counsel at photographic displays was United States
v. Zeiler, 427 F.2d 1305 (3d Cir. 1970)'-however the Third Circuit overruled this case
in United States ex rel. Reed v. Anderson, 461 F.2d 739 (3d Cit. 1972).
39 See, e.g., United States v. Marson, 408 F.2d 644, 653 (4th Cir. 1968) (Winter, J.,
concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1056 (1969). See generally P. WALL,
EYE-WITNESS IDENT!FICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (1971).
40 See cases cited note 37 supra.
41 See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 899 (2d Cir. 1969), in which Judge
Friendly stated:
... to require that defense counsel be allowed or appointed to attend out-of-court
proceedings where the defendant himself is not present would press the Sixth Amend-
ment beyond any previous boundary.,
42See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 423 F.2d 127, 131 (5th Cir. 1970); United States
v. Collins, 416 F.2d 696, 700 (4th Cit. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1025 (1970).
43 407 U.S. 909 (1972).
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II. A CRIcAL ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES V. ASH
Mr. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, refused to extend the Wade
rationale to the photographic display situation in United States v. Ash. The Court
said that a photographic display was not a critical stage triggering the right to
counsel, since the accused was not physically present at the identification.44 In-
terestingly, no prior decision of the Court had specifically held that the presence
of the accused was a necessary prerequisite to having the right to counsel attach
at any particular stage of the proceeding. 45
As support for the Court's new concept of the sixth amendment, Mr. Justice
Blackmun carefully examined the Supreme Court cases dealing with the right to
counsel. 46 He correctly observed that the accused was present at every stage of
the proceedings that the Court had subsequently labeled critical.47 His view was
that the right to counsel was created because the "unaided layman had little skill
in arguing the law or in coping with an intricate procedural system."4  The
guiding hand of counsel was needed to "minimize the imbalance in the adversary
system that otherwise resulted with the entry of a professional prosecuting offi-
cial." 49
In other words, counsel's role was to act as an advisor to the accused. His
mission was to assure that the accused would have available all defenses that the
law permitted.50 If the accused was not present at a particular step in the criminal
process, the sixth amendment did not require the presence of counsel since the
accused needed no legal advice at that step.51
The Court's recognition that confrontation is an essential element of the critical
stage, and that counsel should be required only when the accused is in need of
legal advice, is readily supported by early opinions construing the sixth amend-
ment. 52 However, the reliance upon confrontation in United States v. Ash is
4493 S. Ct. at 2577.
451d. at 2588 (Brennan, J., dissenting); See also 388 U.S. at 226 where Justice Brennan
defines a critical stage as any stage of the prosecution where counsel's absence might derogate
from the accused's right to a fair trial. Implicit in Justice Brennan's opinion in Wade is
the fact that the right to counsel exists "whenever necessary to assure a meaningful defense"
regardless of whether the accused is present. Id. at 225.
46 See cases cited note 15 supra.
47 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) and Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201 (1964) involved police interrogations. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) involved
a preliminary hearing. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) involved an arraignment
at which the defense of insanity had to be pleaded or lost. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932) dealt with the right to counsel at trial.
48 93 S. Ct. at 2572.
49 Id. at 2573.
5OSee State v. Williams, 97 N.J. Super 573, 601, 235 A.2d 684, 698 (Bergen County
C. 1967), where the court defined a critical stage:
A critical stage in the criminal process is thus one in which defendant's rights may
be lost, defenses waived, privileges claimed or waived, or which in some other way
substantially may affect the outcome of the case.
51 See United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 899-900 (2d Cir. 1969) where Judge
Friendly refused to extend the Wade rationale to a photographic identification:
None of the classical analyses of the assistance to be given by counsel, Justice Suther-
land's in Powell v. Alabama and Justice Black's in Johnson v. Zerbst and Gideon v.
Wainwrigh;, suggests that counsel must be present when the prosecution is interrogat-
ing witnesses in the defendant's absence even when, as here, the defendant is under
arrest. ... (Citations omitted).52S ee Annor., 1,8 L Ed. 2d 1420 (1968) for a general discussion of' the Supreme Court's
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inconsistent with the rationale of Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall. The lineup cases
were not concerned with the advisory role of the attorney, but rather with his
aility to effectively reconstruct at trial the identification scene. The Wade opinion
described counsel's role as that of an observer who would report at trial the fairness
of the lineup procedure. This observer role that the Court recognized in Wade
was not dependent upon the presence of the accused at the particular stage, but
rather upon the possibility of prejudicial suggestion and reconstruction difficulty
surrounding the activities of a particular stage. Counsel was not expected to advise
his client at the lineup. In fact, the Wade opinion began by suggesting that
a lineup does not violate an accused's right against self-incrimination,58 and there-
fore counsel could not even advise the accused to refuse to participate.
On this point, therefore, the reasoning of the Ash opinion directly conflicts
with the reasoning of the Wade opinion. Unfortunately, the majority opinion
in Ash refused to confront this conflict. Rather it chose to distinguish the cases
on the basis of the physical presence of the accused. But Mr. Justice Brennan,
the author of the Wade opinion, made clear in his- dissent in Ash that the accused's
physical presence was not the point on which the Wade opinion turned. He
stated:
The fundamental premise underlying all of this Court's decisions holding
the right to counsel applicable at "critical" pretrial proceedings, is that -a
"stage" of the prosecution must be deemed "critical" for the purposes of
the Sixth Amendment if it is one at which the presence of counsel is
necessary "to protect the fairness of the trial itself." 54
The conflict between the Wade opinion and the Ash opinion becomes even
more apparent when one analyzes photographic identification procedures and real-
izes that all of the dangers that concerned the Court in the lineup cases are
present in a photographic identification. 55 Inherent in the two procedures are
the same possibilities for prejudical suggestion. These possibilities arise from the
choice of photographs used, the order in which they are presented and the time
which the witness is given to study them.56 Furthermore, it is not unrealistic
to recognize that a police officer might even directly suggest that a particular photo-
graph should be considered more carefully than others.57 Just as with a lineup,
right to counsel cases. See also Comment, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel
During Police Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000 (1964) for an analytical work tracing the
development of the right to counsel through medieval law and common law to 1964.
58 388 U.S. at 221.
54 93 S. Ct. at 2588-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See United States ex rel. Reed v.
Anderson, 461 F.2d 739, 750 (3d Cir. 1972) (Hastie, J., concurring and dissenting):
Therefore, the majority reasons, the Court was treating the physical confrontation
of accused and witness as the circumstance that made a lineup a "critical stage" of
the prosecution and thus entitled the accused to the assistance of counsel. But if this
had been what made the lineup a critical state of prosecution, it is hard to believe
that the court would not have made explicit and would not have undertaken to justify
so important a conclusion.
55 See periodicals cited note 36 supra.
56See 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1019, 1021-22 (1968).
57 See United States v. Marson, 408 F.2d 644, 653 (4th Cir. 1968) (Winter, J., concurring
and dissenting). Judge Winter would interpret the Wade opinion to apply similarly to photo-
graphic displays.'
Aside from direct prejudical oral communications between police officers and a witness
asked to make an identification, an unscrupulous police officer, or even a scrupulous
police officer, unwittingly, may influence the identification by the manner in which
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there is no way that counsel can protect his client against such prejudicial suggestion
unless he is allowed to be present. A witness who is involved in the identifica-
tion procedure can hardly be expected to detect the subtleties of suggestion which
occur at a photographic display. 58 Therefore, without counsel's presence the op-
portunity to impeach the credibility of the eyewitness identification vanishes forever.
In one respect a lineup is even less likely than a photographic display to jeopar-
dize the accused's right to a fair trial. The physical presence of the accused at
the lineup increases the likelihood than any prejudicial suggestion can be brought
out at trial. But in a photographic display, not even the accused is present to
observe the procedures and detect instances of possible suggestion. 59 Nevertheless,
the Ash Court chose the physical presence of the accused as the basis upon which
to distinguish the two cases.
Whether or not one accepts the Court's conclusion that a photographic display
is not a critical stage of the criminal process, it is obvious that the Ash Court
incorrectly uses the Wlade opinion to support its reasoning. In all likelihood,
the members of the Court who decided the Wade case would have assigned the
accused a right to counsel at post-indictment photographic displays if they had
been called upon to decide that issue six years ago. In fact, the dissent in Wade
specifically recognized that the Wlade rule would: apply "to any other techniques
employed to produce an identification.'' 0 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court refused
to overrule the Wade decision in Ash, even though its opinion dearly indicates
that it was unhappy with its sweeping language. Just as the Wade Court failed
to meet the lineup issues directly, the Ash Court refused to deal with the Wlade
decision directly.
There is a natural reluctance on the part of Supreme Court Justices to overrule
prior decisions.61 But especially where a sounder rationale presents itself as an al-
ternative to the direction of a previous opinion, the Court should adopt that ra-
tionale rather than distort the dear language of the earlier opinion.6 2  Wade was
not a confrontation case. For the Court to say that it was is to inject a certain
intellectual dishonesty into the decision making process. In effect, the Court indi-
rectly overruled elements of the Wade decision in Kirby and Ash. Nothing in
the Wade opinion suggested that its rationale would not be equally applicable
to pre-indictment lineups or photographic displays.6 3 Such indirect overruling is
not healthy for the judicial system.6 4
they are handed to the witness-in short, by any of the myriad forms of suggestion
possible in the context of an in camera identification.58 Mr. Justice Brennan uses similar language in suggesting the difficulty of reconstructing
a lineup identification. 388 U.S. at 230-31.
59 93 S. Ct. at 2591 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
60 388 U.Stat 251 (White, J., concurring and dissenting).
6 1 See Moore & Oglebay, The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis and Law of the Case, 21
TEx. L REv. 514, 539-40 (1943).6 2 See Noland, Stare Decisis and the Overruing of Constitutional Decisions in the Warren
Years, 4 VAL. U.L. REV. 101 (1969).
6 5See Commonwealth v. Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 209, 266 A.2d 738, 740 (1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 919 (1970):
As for the photographic lineup employed in the instant case, the necessity for counsel
at that confrontation is implicit in Wade, which factually concerned a corporeal line-
up. Wade cannot be undercut simply by substituting pictures for people, nor can
the police prepare a witness for the lineup by privately showing the witness pictures
of the accused.64 Heimanson, Overruling-An Instrument of Social Change? 7 N.Y.U.L.F. 167, 170
(1961).
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III. THE AFTERMATH OF ASH
If and until the Supreme Court chooses to clarify the ambiguities that it has
created in the area of eyewitness identification, the criminal process must operate
amid the confusion and inconsistency of the Wade and Ash opinions. Out of
this confusion, certain rules of thumb may be extracted. First, an accused has
a right to counsel at all post-indictment lineups. Second, there is no right to
counsel at a photographic display regardless of when in the criminal proceeding
the display is conducted. Finally, all eyewitness identifications not covered by
the subsequently narrowed Wade opinion are subject to the due process test enun-
ciated in Simmons v. United States65 and Stovall v. Denno.66
Simmons involved the robbery of a Chicago savings and loan association and
provided the Court with an opportunity to deal directly with photographic identi-
fications. The morning following the robbery, five eyewitnesses were shown snap-
shots which included pictures of the petitioner Simmons. All five witnesses identi-
fied Simmons; he was subsequently arrested, indicted, and convicted of the robbery.
He appealed to the Supreme Cout alleging that the identification procedure was
so unduly prejudicial as to fatally taint his conviction. 67
The Court rejected petitioner's argument, but not before recognizing the dangers
of prejudicial suggestion inherent in photographic identifications.68 Noting that
Simmons was not yet in custody at the time of the photographic identification,
the Court stated:
Despite the hazards of initial identification by photograph, this procedure
has been used widely and effectively in criminal law enforcement, from
the standpoint both of apprehending offenders and of sparing innocent
suspects the ignominy of arrest by allowing eyewitnesses to exonerate them
through scrutiny of photographs.6 9
Furthermore, the Court found that the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding
the identification procedure, including the fact that the perpetrators of a felony
were still at large, did not warrant a -finding of an unduly prejudicial identifica-
tion.70 The Court went on to conclude that evidence of pretrial photographic
identification is inadmissable at trial only if the identification procedure is "so




In applying the Simmons rule, one question immediately comes to mind: How
can the accused or his counsel detect any unfair suggestion in pretrial identifica-
tions if neither is present to witness them? The answer is simple-they cannot
with any degree of effectiveness. On cross-examination, counsel must probe in
the dark to discover any unfair suggestion prior to trial.72 The failure of the
Ash Court to recognize this is a grave flaw in its decision. While the Court
65 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
66 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
67 390 U.S. at 381.
68Id. at 383-84.
691 d. at 384.
7 0 See also Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969) and Coleman v. Alabama, 399
U.S. 1 (1970) which applied the "totality of the circumstances test" enunciated in Simmons
to pre-Wade lineups.
71 390 U.S. at 384.
72 The same situation concerned the Court in lineup identifications. United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 240-41 (1967).
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does recognize that the photographs themselves could be made available to defense
counsel, that alone does not insure adequate cross-examination and a fair trial.
The availability of the photographs does nothing to illuminate the manner in which
they were displayed or the unconscious suggestion that the exhibitor conveyed to
the witness.73
While the failure of the Court to demand that the accused's counsel be provided
with some means of determining what occurred at the identification procedure
is probably the greatest defect of the Ash opinion, it is by no means its only
shortcoming. As the law stands now, the prosecution must notify the accused's
counsel and provide him with an opportunity to be present before a post-indict-
ment lineup can be conducted.7 4 Pursuant to Ash, this need for notifying defense
counsel can be avoided by conducting a photographic display rather than a lineup.
In most cases, one identification procedure would be as acceptable to the prosecution
as another, and so it is not too difficult to forecast a movement away from lineups
as a tool in the identification process.
Unfortunately, the shift from lineups to photographic displays has already be-
gun. In People v. Lawrence,75 a lineup was conducted at which the accused was
not afforded counsel. A photograph of the lineup was taken and presented to
the witness. The witness selected the accused from the photograph. Over a strong
dissent, a majority of the California supreme court permitted the introduction
of the pretrial identification in court even though the photograph was admittedly
employed to circumvent the Wade rule. The court held that there was no right
to counsel at the photographic display and that the identification procedure did
not violate the Simmons test.
As long as the inconsistency between Wade and Ash remains, the "Lawrence
lineup" 78 will become the rule, rather than the exception, in the area of eyewitness
identification. 77 But photographic identifications are unquestionably inferior to cor-
poreal identifications, if for no other reason than the fact that a picture depicts
only two dimensions.78 Therefore, the undesirable but inevitable consequence of
Ash will be an increased use of secondary sources of evidence in the determination
of an accused's guilt or innocence.7 9
73 93 S. Ct. at 2585 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,237 (1967).
75 4 Cal. 3d 273,481 P.2d 212 (1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 909 (1972).
761d. at 217.
77 See United States v. Marson, 408 F.2d 644, 654 (4th Cit. 1968) (Winter, J., concurring
and dissenting). Judge Winter stated:
To hold that a post-custody identification by resort to photographs without counsel,
absent the waiver of counsel is constitutionally permissable would be to invite law
enforcement officers to avoid the presence of counsel by resort to identification by
photographs. This would be an unfortunate consequence of declining to extend Wade
and Gilbert, because the quest for ultimate truth, the basic purpose of a criminal trial
would be relegated to secondary sources.
7 8 See P. WALL, EYE-WITNEaSS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES, 70 (1971), where
the author concludes:
Because of the inherent limitations of photography, which presents its subject in
two dimensions .rather than the three dimensions of reality, and which presents a
"frozen" image, often not too similar to the image of the living, moving subject, and
also because a police photograph may be an old one which no longer accurately depicts
its subject, a photographic identification, even when properly obtained, is dearly
inferior to a properly obtained corporeal identification.
See People v. Gould, 54 Cal. 2d 621, 631, 354 P.2d 685, 870 (1960).
7 9 See Wright v. United States, 404 F.2d 1256, 1262 (D.C. Cit. 1968) (Bazelork, J.,
dissenting):
1973]
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Another aspect of Ash which the Court ignores, but which may return to
plague it in the near future, concerns the failure of the Court to establish any
specific due process standards regarding the application of the Simmons test.
Whereas the exclusionary rule suggested in Wade and set forth in Gilbert v. Cali-
fornia ° can be applied with little difficulty, the Simmons test requires the Court
to consider the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding an identification event.81
Not only is this time consuming but, even more unfortunately, it encourages the
Court to resolve a case based on unarticulated concepts of fairness and fundamental
justice rather than upon more precise criteria. 82
In short, the Ash opinion is a peculiar combination of sound constitutional
reasoning and ill-considered generalities. Consistent with the Court's early deci-
sions interpreting the sixth amendment, the Ash Court recognizes that confrontation
is a prerequisite to labeling a stage of the criminal proceedings critical, but it
fails to suggest a viable alternative to the right to counsel at pretrial identifications.
It correctly concludes that a pretrial photographic display is not a critical stage
of the proceedings at which the right to counsel attaches, but it fails to provide
any realistic safe-guards against the use of unduly suggestive photographic proce-
dures. It recognizes that the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments protect the defendant against improper identification, but it fails to establish
any guidelines to aid in the implementation of a due process standard. Finally,
the Ash opinion fails to distinguish adequately United States--v. Wade. This failure
will result in a shift from the use of lineups to a use of less reliable photographic
identifications.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite its deficiencies, the Ash opinion should be welcomed by the legal com-
munity. It does finally resolve an issue which has troubled lower courts for six
years. Although nine of the ten courts of appeal which have dealt with the
right to counsel at photographic displays reached the conclusion that no such right
existed, these conclusions were not reached with unanimity.8 3 In most cases, strong
dissents were filed which pointed out the weaknesses of the majority opinions.8 4
Still, the Supreme Court has left some questions unanswered in the area of photo-
graphic identification. For the sake of the criminal process, it should act quickly
to eliminate the weaknesses of the Ash opinion.
The Court would go a long way towards clearing up the problems surrounding
eyewitness identification evidence if it were to establish specific due process guide-
lines.8 5 As the law now stands, the Simmons test is too vague to be applied
I believe that due process is violated whenever the police unjustifiably fail to hold a
lineup. Since mistaken identifications are probably the greatest cause of erroneous
convictions, we must require the fairest identification procedures available under the
circumstances. With the stakes so high, due-process does not permit second best.
80 388 U.S. 236 (1967).
81 See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra.
8 2 See Stovall v- Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 305 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
8 8 See, e.g., United States ex Tel. Reed v. Anderson, 461 F.2d 739 (1972).
84 See, e.g., Wright v. United States, 404 F.2d 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United States
v. Marson, 408 F.2d 644 (4th Cir. 1968).
85An analogy can be drawn between the police interrogation cases, Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); and Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and the cases dealing with eyewitness identification. In the
former set of cases, the Court was concerned with coerced confessions, but rather than formu-
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with any degree of success. Presumably, the Court will be called upon repeatedly
to determine whether certain photographic identification techniques are unduly sug-
gestive. Perhaps after several cases have been decided by the Court, specific guide-
lines will appear. But because of the inherent unreliability of eyewitness identi-
fication and the tendency of juries to give great weight to such evidence, the
criminal system cannot wait several years for the Ash opinion to be explained.
The Court should particularly take upon itself the task of insuring that photo-
graphic displays do not replace the more reliable lineup as the commonly used
method of obtaining identification evidence. The Court has already suggested a
mechanism which can prevent the expanded use of photographic displays. That
mechanism, implicit in the Simmons test but not yet specifically stated by the Court,
would require a reversal of any conviction based on photographic identification
whenever the prosecution could have feasibly conducted a lineup but neglected
to do so.86 The prosecution would bear the burden of proving by dear and
convincing evidence that a lineup could not have been conducted. Furthermore,
there would be - strong presumption that whenever the accused is in custody
a lineup is feasible.87 Indeed, except in unusual circumstances, the only time
a photographic display should be employed is when the accused is at large.88 Once
he is taken into custody, the compelling considerations supporting the use of a
photographic display virtually disappear.
This is not to suggest that a photographic identification is improper in all
cases where the accused is in custody. For instance, a sitution such as existed
in Stovall v. Denno where the witness was thought to be dying might permit
the use of photographs as a matter of necessity.89 But the situations which would
justify the use of a photographic display when the accused is in custody are few
and should be scrutinized carefully.
Anytime a photographic display is conducted when a lineup is possible, the
identification procedure is "so impermissably suggestive as to give rise to a very
lating due process guidelines prohibiting coerced confessions, the Court assigned counsel the
duty of guarding against their dangers. Similarly, in the later cases, the Court was concerned
with the dangers of eyewitness evidence, but rather than defining specific due process rules,
the Court assigned counseO the duty to guard against the dangers of lineup identifications.
Both solutions are indirect ways of dealing with the problems and have caused the courts
much difficulty in application. Perhaps a direct assault on the problems would create less
confusion and more successfully remedy the problems bothering the Court.
86 See text-accompanying notes 74-79 supra.
8 7 See Wright v. United States, 404 F.2d 1256, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting). But see, e.g., United States v. Serio, 440 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Ballard, 423 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888
(2d Cir. 1969).
88 The key to the resolution of the Simmons case and the Stovall case is that the identification
procedures involved were employed because they were the only ones available in the particular
circumstances. In Simmons, the defendants were still at large at the time of the identification.
In Stovall, the only witness was in critical condition and there was no time to arrange a
lineup. These cases suggest that necessity may be the principal deterniinhg factor in the
resolution of a case under the due process test. See United States v. Washington, 292 F.
Supp. 284, 288 (D.D.C. 1968), where the court applied the Simmons test to photographic
identifications:
In sharp contrast to Simmons, therefore, which represented a case involving a high
degree of necessity for the photogiaphic identification, and a low level of suggestivity,
the present case involves no necessity whatsoever and quite a high level of suggestivity.
Thus balanced, and in light of the factors deemed relevant in Simmons, this Court
finds a serious violation of due process.
89 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
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substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification." 90  This is just one example
of a specific guideline which the Court should set forth to insure a meaningful
application of the reasoning in United States v. Ash..
John H. Burtch
CRIMINAL PROCEDUREDIscMINATRY ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL PE-
NAL LAws-United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973).
On December 4, 1967, as part of the national "Vietnam Week" protests against
American involvement in the war, Jeffrey Stuart Falk mailed his Selective Service
Registration card to the Department of Justice. In October of 1968 Falk mailed his
1968 I-A classification notice to a federal judge, and in May of 1969 he mailed his
1969 classification notice back to his local draft board. Each of these protestant
acts of dispossession of Selective Service notices constituted a violation of a federal
statute.1
In 1968, Falk applied for reclassification as a conscientious objector,2 but his
application was rejected. When his scheduled date for induction came in May
1970 Falk refused to submit. He was subsequently charged in a four-count indict-
ment with refusing to submit to induction3 and with failing to possess his registra-
tion card or his 1968 and 1969 classification cards. 4 Falk filed a pre-trial motion
in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois5 for dismissal of the
card possession counts, alleging that the United States Attorney had sought his
indictment on these charges solely to "punish" him for his outspoken criticism
of government foreign policy,6 thus denying him equal protection of the law through
discriminatory enforcement. The district court denied Falk's motion without hold-
ing an evidentiary hearing and at trial rejected Falk's offer to prove improper
prosecutorial motive. A jury found Falk guilty.7
In an en banc rehearing of his appeal, 8 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit vacated Falk's conviction on the card possession counts and remanded the
case to the district court for a hearing on the allegations of discriminatory enforce-
ment.9 In so ordering, the Seventh Circuit took unprecedented action in setting
90 Considering custody to be the key event in the determination of the totality of the
circumstances test is not at odds with Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972). Although
Kirby limits the right to counsel recognized in Wade to post-indictment lineups, it does
not suggest that custody might not be the key event in the application of the Simmons
due process test.
1 Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. APP. § 462 (1971).
2 Id. § 456.
3 Id. § 462; 32 C.B.R. § 1641.5 (Supp. 1973).
4 32 C.F.R. §§ 1613.11, 1623.4 (Supp. 1973).
5 United States v. Falk, Crim. No. 70 CR 515 (N.D. Ill., filed Nov. 1970).
6 United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 619 (7th Cir. 1973).
7 Falk was found guilty on all four counts; however, the court granted a post-trial motion
for acquittal of the conviction for refusing to submit to induction. The court found no
basis in fact for denying Falk classification as a conscientious objector. Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
8 United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973).
9 It must be noted that the appellate court's opinion is not overtly based on any denial
of Falk's first amendment rights. But Falk's allusion to the possible chilling effect of prosecu-
tion, in the context of a period of widespread protests, may reasonably lead to the conclusion
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standards for the finding of discriminatory enforcement of penal laws by United
States Attorneys. The court of appeals found not only that Falk's charges of
discrimination raised a material issue of fact so as to merit an evidentiary hearing
on the motion to dismiss, but also that the inferences raised by Falk's contentions
were so strong as to make out a prima facie case of discrimination. Thus the
burden of proving non-discrimination shifted to the Government, and the Assistant
United States Attorney was forced to take the stand to explain his motives.' 0 The
decision raises serious questions concerning the quantum and nature of proof neces-
sary to establish a prima facie denial of equal protection through selective prosecu-
tion and concerning judicial power to review discretionary actions by federal prose-
cutors.
The guarantee of equal protection of the law" applies to all branches of
government. As early as 1886 the Supreme Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins12
made clear that the guarantee applied to action by executive officials. In Yick
Wo, a city ordinance that required a license to operate a laundry in a wooden
building was challenged as discriminating principally against Chinese. In holding
criminal enforcement of the statute unconstitutional, the Court stated:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance,
yet if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye
and an unequal hand, so as to practically make unjust and illegal dis-
criminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their
rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
Constitution.13
In a 1962 decision, Oyler v. Boles,'4 the Supreme Court cautioned persons
claiming discriminatory prosecution not to rely too readily on a literal reading
of Yick Wo as an automatic bar to their conviction. In Oyler, the appellant
charged that he had been singled out for prosecution under a state recidivist statute
while others eligible for such prosecution were not so charged. The Court set
forth its oft-repeated rule:
The conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself
a federal constitutional violation. Even though the statistics in this case
might imply a policy of selective enforcement, it was not stated that the
selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as
rac6, religion or other arbitrary classification.' 5
The breadth of this acknowledgment of prosecutorial discretion has caused courts
to summarily dismiss charges of discrimination in numerous cases in the post-
Oyler period.16 Almost without exception, these cases have turned on either of
that the decision was in fact based on the court's unarticulated but overriding desire to protect
free speech rights.
10 479 F.2d at 623-24.
" The equal protection guarantee has been held applicable to the federal government
through the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
12 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
18 Id. at 373-74.
14 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
15 Id. at 456.
16E.g., Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 359 (1953); United States v. Alarik, 439
F.2d 1349, 1350-51 (8th Cir. 1971); Powell v. Power, 436 F.2d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 1970);
United States v. Malinowski, 347 F. Supp. 347, 353-54 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Hammond v. Brown,
323 F. Supp. 326 (N.D. Ohio), affd on other grounds, 450 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1971).
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two facts: (1) the defendant was unable to offer evidence sufficient to satisfy
the court that discrimination had in fact occurred; 17 or (2) the Government was
able to show a discernible pattern of prosecution of violators grounded upon a
legitimate selection process.1s
In holding that Falk had made out a prima facie case of discriminatory enforce-
ment, the court relied heavily on two recent decisions in other circuits. Each of
these two cases involved prosecution of political dissenters for violations of federal
statutes, and in each the Oyler rule was held to be inapplicable. In the first
case, United States v. Crowthers,19 the defendants, who had held an unauthorized
Episcopal "Mass for Peace" in the Pentagon concourse, were charged with disturbing
the general public and impeding public employees in the conduct of government
business.20 In placing the burden of proving non-discriminatory prosecution on
the Government, the Fourth Circuit noted the defendant's showing of sixteen other
political or religious ceremonies in the concourse. Each of these other ceremonies
was shown to have created more noise or obstruction than the defendants' mass;
however, each was distinctly pro-Administration in tone, thus raising a strong in-
ference of discrimination in the Government's prosecution.21
In the second case, United States v. Steele,22 a conviction for refusal to answer
census questions23 was reversed by the Ninth Circuit when the Government was
unable to "explain away" the strong inference of discrimination raised by the defen-
dant's evidence. Steele was able to show that he and three other vocal census
resisters in Hawaii were the only persons prosecuted, while at least six other identi-
fied persons who had refused to answer the questions, but who had not vocally
protested, were not prosecuted.24
Thus the -defendants in Steele and Crowthers were able to present to the court
the names of other violators and the nature, times, and places of their offenses.
The defendants were able to prove that these other violators were or should have
been known to the Government and that their offenses, although similar to those
of the defendants, were either disposed of without court action or were ignored
completely.
Against this background, it can be readily seen that the allegations made by
Falk lacked the specificity and substance that were present in those made by Steele
and Crowthers. Falk only "expressed his belief" that some 25,000 other men
had dispossessed themselves of their draft cards, but had not been prosecuted,
and that he had been indicted solely because of his activities protesting the war
and the draft.25 He failed to allege one of the requisite elements of a claim
of denial of equal protection: the drawing of a line "between him, who possesses
17 United States v. Gebhart, 441 F.2d 1261, 1265 (6th Cir. 1971); Powell v. Power,
436 F.2d 84,88 (2d Cit. 1970).
18 United States v. Sacco, 428 F.2d 264,271 (9th Cir. 1970).
19 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972).
20 The charges were based upon 40 U.S.C. § 318 (1971).
21456 F.2d at 1079.
22 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972).
23 In violation of 13 U.S.C. § 221(a) (1971).
24 461 F.2d at 1152. Statistics on "uneven" application of a particular law are apparently
not sufficient alone to make out a case of discrimination. In Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,
456 (1962), the Supreme Court disregarded Oyler's listing of the names of the 904 other
offenders eligible for prosecution under the West Virginia recidivist statute who were not
so prosecuted.
25 479 P.2d at 621.
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a certain characteristic, and others, similarly situated, who do not possess that char-
acteristic."2 6  Specifically, he failed to allege that these 25,000 other men who
were not prosecuted had not publicly protested the war and the draft. Further,
Falk did not show that the unidentified 25,000 men had refused induction, or
that they had not had their claims processed administratively, or that they were
otherwise situated similarly to him.27 Falk did allege, however, that the Assistant
United States Attorney prosecuting his case had told Falk's counsel in a pre-trial
conference that Falk was, in fact, being prosecuted because of his anti-draft activi-
ties. This allegation seemed to be controlling in the court of appeal's decision
to grant the new evidentiary hearing at which the Assistant United States Attorney
would be required to explain and prove the legitimacy of the Government's motives
in prosecuting Falk.
For Falk to have the charges against him dismissed, he ordinarily would have
been required to prove a denial of equal protection. To prove this denial, Falk
would have to be granted an evidentiary hearing, and to be granted an evidentiary
hearing, Falk would have at least been required to allege that there was a material
question of fact whether his fourteenth amendment rights had been violated. The
remarks of the Assistant United States Attorney d9 not alone constitute an allega-
tion of a denial of equal protection. Even if the statement were true, it must
be shown that the "singling out" was discriminatory. There must be a comparison
of Falk with others to show that they possess the same characteristics as Falk,
but were not singled out. Since Falk failed to make such a comparison, the eviden-
tiary hearing must have been granted solely on the basis of 'the alleged remarks
by the Assistant United States Attorney. Thus without ever having alleged facts
sufficient under traditional standards to establish a denial of equal protection,28
Falk forced the Government to prove that no such denial occurred. The Seventh
Circuit was apparently willing to overlook Falk's pleading failure because of the
relative importance it gave to policy considerations underlying discriminatory en-
forcement.
Some very basic constitutional values become apparent in analyzing cases such
as Falk, Steele, and Crowthers; these are the need for enforcement of valid laws,
the need for fair enforcement of valid laws, and the need to safeguard fundamental
rights, such as free speech. While the Seventh Circuit in Falk gave token attention
to each value, it applied them collectively in an unsatisfactory manner.
The court failed to recognize that the United States Attorney is charged with
the faithful enforcement of all federal laws, yet the number of potential defendants
is incalculable. This situation is exemplified by Falk in which there may indeed
have been 25,000 other violators. The United States Attorney is retarded by lim-
ited resources and time, but is pressured by a public concerned about the level
of crime and outraged at symbolic public violations by political dissidents who
appear to act with impunity. Dutyjbound to enforce the laws, yet physically unable
to enforce all laws against all violators, the prosecutor must necessarily exercise
considerable discretion.
Before Falk, there were no cases in which United States Attorneys were forced
to prove non-discriminatory prosecution;29 the defendants had always borne the
26 Id. at 626 n.2. (Cummings, J., dissenting). See also Yick WQ v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 359 (1886).
27 479 F.2d at 626 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
28 See text accompanying notes 32-33 infra.
29 In United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1972), and United States
v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074, 1079 (4th Cir. 1973), the officials called upon to explain
1973]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
heavy burden of proof. For two reasons this burden was nearly impossible to
carry. First, one of the best methods to prove discrimination is testimony as to its
existence.8 0 Except for the availability of hearsay, as in Falk, the defendant must
force the prosecutor to admit his motives. Even if such testimony were available to
prove intentional selection, the court might still consider such selection to be rea-
sonable.8 ' Thus the defendant would be forced to rely on inferential proof. But
to raise the necessary inferences, the defendant has traditionally been forced to
produce: (1) evidence that a number of identifiable violators have not been prose-
cuted;3 2 (2) evidence that these persons were situated similarly to the defendant
and were known to the prosecutor;38 and (3) evidence that the defendant alone
possessed a characteristic that was focused upon by the prosecutor in singling him
out.8 4 The difficulty of such proof is self-evidpnt.
The second reason for the defendant's nearly impossible burden of proof is
the natural reluctance of courts to question the motives of prosecutors in bringing
charges. The discretionary power of the prosecutor is considered essential by courts
to the fair and effective administration of justice.8 5 This attitude is best exemplified
in an opinion by Chief Justice (then Circuit Judge) Burger in Newman v. United
States:38
It is not the function of the judiciary to review the exercise of executive
discretion, whether it be that of the President himself or those to whom
he has delegated certain of his powers.8 7
A similar opinion is voiced by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Cox,88 in
which the court cites the doctrine of separation of powers as an injunction upon
courts "not to interfere with the free excercise of the discretionary power" of
United States Attorneys in prosecuting criminal cases. A defendant like Falk who
asks that the United States Attorney be examined regarding his reasons for bringing
the prosecution normally fights an uphill battle against this traditional presumption
of regularity.
Since it is impossible for the Government to prosecute all offenders, one logical
their motives in bringing charges against the defendant were a Regional Census Director
and the Regional Counsel of the General Services Administration, respectively. In a recent
decision, a defendant alleging discriminatory enforcement by a United States Attorney was
unable to convince the Third Circuit that the United States Attorney should be called to
the stand to prove non-discrimination in a prosecution for smuggling letters out of a federal
prison, the court refusing to follow Falk. United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d
Cir. 1973).
SOComment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61 Co-
LuM. L. REV. 1103, 1122 (1961).
81 Id.; see United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1972).
32 United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Crowthers,
456 F.2d 1074, 1079 (4th Cir. 1973). See discussion at note 24 supra.
38 United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 626 (7th Cir. 1973) (Cummings, J., dissenting).
84 See cases cited at note 16 supra.
35 Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61 Co-
LUM. L. REv. 1103, 1119 (1961).
U8382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
87 Id. at 482.
38 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965). See also Spillman
v. United States, 413 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 396 U.S. 930 (1969); Dear
Wing Jung v. United States, 312 F.2d 73, 75 (9th Cir. 1962); Goldberg v. Hoffman, 225
F.2d 463,467 (7th Cir. 1955).
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method for enforcing the laws might be prosecution of "high visibility" violators.3 9
This method, if not used with the intention of denying the exercise of fundamental
rights, could serve two goals in which the Government has a compelling interest;
(1) the deterrence of other potential violators; and (2) the creation of a rational,
non-discriminatory pattern of enforcement. 40 If a highly visible violator, such as
Falk, is permitted to commit a crime and then evade prosecution merely because
he had, at some time, exercised his first amendment rights, the ability of the Govern-
ment to effectively enforce its laws would be substantially impaired.
The Seventh Circuit took the position that in Falk's case the charge of refusal
to submit to induction had been found invalid4' and that it had previously been
the policy of the Government not to prosecute persons solely for card possession
offenses. 42 Assuming that Falk's anti-draft activities were exercises of first amend-
ment rights, the logical explanation for his prosecution could only be his anti-
Administration posture, especially in light of the remarks allegedly made by the
Assistant United States Attorney. The court in Falk thus saw the key question
not to be whether Falk had stated or shown an acceptable equal protection claim,
but rather whether the court should become a party to a conviction that might
be later construed as a reprisal against a person espousing views at variance with
governmental policy. Regardless of Falk's obvious guilt or a proper pattern of
governmental enforcement, the court's view of the role of the judiciary in the
separation of powers prevailed over any other consideration: "[T]he judiciary has
always borne the basic responsibility for protecting individuals against unconstitu-
tional invasions of their rights by all branches of the Government." 48
Taken out of context, this last stated principle would be criticized by few,
but its application in Falk produced a questionable result. It is vitally important
to protect the expression of unpopular viewpoints, and often the courts are the
only available instrumentality for doing so. However, the now diminished showing
that a defendant must make to establish an equal protection claim of unlawful
selective prosecution and the accompanying facility with which a defendant can
cal the prosecutor to the stand to defend his motives could severely impede
the administration of criminal justice and damage the credibility of the federal
courts.
The perils of adopting the Falk approach are several. First, it will subject
the courts to new delays in the processing of frivolous claims, since the defendant
9 United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 634 (7th Cir. 1973) (Cummings, J., dissenting).
4 0 People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 21, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128, 136
(1962).
41479 F.2d at 622. It must be noted that the charge for refusal to submit to induction
was found to be invalid only in post-trial proceedings in the district court. The Seventh
Circuit apparently is once again relying on the out-of-court remarks of the Assistant United
States Attorney to defense counsel to the effect that the Government "wasn't sure about Count
I,- rather than implying that the Government could have known in advance that Falk would
be acquitted on this count. Id. at 636. (Cummings, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 622, citing statements by Lt. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, Directorj Selective Service
System in U.S. GOvERNMENT PRINTING OFFIcE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF SELECrIvE SERVICE
47 (1969). The court's reliance on this statement of "Government" policy seems somewhat
ill-founded, however, since the Supreme Court effectively outlawed administrative handling
of delinquency cases by local draft boards after the Hershey statement and before Falk's
indictment. See Breen v. Selective Service Local Board No. 16, 396 U.S. 460 (1970); Oesterich
v. Selective Service Local Board No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
43 479 F.2d at 624, citing Stamler v. Willis, 415 F.2d 1365, 1369-70 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied sub. nom. Ichord v. Stamle, 399 U.S. 929 (1970).
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can too easily cast doubt upon the prosecutor's motives. 44 Second, it will hinder
the enforcement of any law if the proscribed activity is malum prohibitum. Indeed,
it may make the enforcement of any law against a vocal or prominent offender
inherently suspect-a presumption that may often be incorrect. Third, such an
approach binds the Government to the unofficial remarks of a relatively low-level
agent. This is arguably incorrect in light of two recent federal decisions45 and
in light of the fact that the Assistant United States Attorney may often be relating
only his personal opinion as to the reasons for the prosecution and not the valid,
prosecutorial motives of the official who actually made the decision to charge.46
Finally, the Falk approach can only tend to exacerbate a public already skeptical
of the willingness of the courts to bring known violators to justice. It is by
no means certain that requiring both a complete statement of the elements of
an equal protection claim and a convincing advance allegation of base prosecutional
motives will soothe a public concerned about unpunished crime. However, the
courts and their supporters will have a much easier task in defending their protec-
tion of such fundamental rights as free speech if this approach is adopted.
The end of American involvement in the Indo-China War and the end of
the draft may severely limit the number of cases in which the circumstances of
Falk arise, and this may partially alleviate the problem of discriminatory enforce-
ment. In addition, the deterrent effect of such decisions may produce caution
on the part of prosecutors or at least force them to have available alternative
"wiser" motives47 for bringing charges when called upon to prove their impartiality.
But tfiese are, at best, short-run and coincidental solutions to the problem of avoid-
ing and proving discriminatory prosecution.
It is incumbent on the legislatures and the courts to devise and implement
effective long-run solutions to the problems that are exposed by Falk. One alterna-
tive solution might be more searching discovery rules and detailed complaints in
criminal cases. These changes would better enable the defense and the court to
determine the basis for the charges against the defendant.
In addition the courts should require defendants to make a prima facie case
of discriminatory prosecution before the prosecutor is required to prove that he
has not abused his discretion. Such a prima facie case should be based on a clear
and specific statement of the circumstances by which the defendant was denied
equal protection. The defendant should be required to state that (1) there
were- other identifiable violators; (2) these other violators committed offenses
substantially the same as those of the defendant; (3) these other violators were
or should have been known to the prosecutor; (4) the defendant possessed some
characteristic not possessed by the other violators; (5) the defendant was prosecuted
soley because he possessed this characteristic; and (6) the other violators were not
prosecuted. This approach would balance prosecutorial discretion and fundamental
rights by enabling prosecutors to discharge their statutory duty to enforce the laws
44 See Address by Hon. William J. Campbell, Conference of Metropolitan Chief District
Judges, 55 F.R.D. 229, 231 (1972).
45United States v. Santos, 372 F.2d 177, 180-81 (2d Cir. 1967) (inconsistent statement
by government narcotics agent not admissible in criminal case as "evidence of the fact");
United States v. Koegh, 271 F. Supp. 1002, 1008 n.22 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (out-of-court state-
ments by prosecution concerning veracity of witness against defendant are hearsay and inad-
missible).
46 United States v. Powers, 467 F.2d 1089, 1095 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
983 (1973); Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion--A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 174,
177 (1965).
4 7 United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 631 '7th Cir. 1973) (Cummings, J., dissenting).
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without fear of arbitrary questioning by courts of their motives, and by giving
defendants a procedure by which they would be able to vindicate their fundamental
rights.
A different approach to the problem would be to set high standards for govern-
ment conduct and strict sanctions against government prosecutors. Adoption of
a system similar to that employed in West Germany,48 where the prosecutor's
records are subject to strict and continuous scrutiny by the courts (which make
all final decisions as to whether or not to proceed with a prosecution) could serve
to eliminate the abuses of prosecutorial discretion. However, such a plan may
effectively eliminate the prosecutor's ability to exercise discretion.
As an absolute minimum, the public must scrutinize prosecutorial activities of
the Government49 and the decision-making of the courts to ensure that equal protec-
tion guarantees and fundamental rights are faithfully recognized.O
Robert G. Joseph
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FRsT AMENDMENT-STATE REGUALTION OF PAR-
TISAN POLITICAL AcTivrrIEs OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEEs-Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 93
S.Ct. 2908 (1973).
A recurring issue in American -politics has been the extent to which the partisan
political activities of public employees may be restricted.1 Clearly, the state has
a vital interest in maintaining a civil service based on merit rather than political
favoritism and in protecting public employees from being coerced by superiors
to participate in partisan politics. A broad prophylactic rule prohibiting virtually
all political activity by public employees would surely accomplish these goals. On
the other hand, the public employee has a vital interest in being able to participate
like any other citizen in the nation's political processes. Historically, this contro-
versy has been resolved against the employee by the legislatures2 and the courtss
through laws which prohibit essentially any active partisan political involvement.
4 8 K. DAVIS, DIStmETnoNARY JUSTICE-A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 191-95 (1969). Under
the West German system, government prosecutors have discretion only as to minor offenses
and even these exercises are subject to judicial review. The prosecutor may neither withhold
prosecution for serious crimes nor engage in plea bargaining. Rather, when the evidence
or law in a case is doubtful, the court will determine whether the case should proceed. Further,
the German prosecutor is required to open a file on every crime reported by the police
or citizens. These files remain open until the final disposition of the case by the courts,
thus eliminating the possibility of a prosecutor merely "forgetting" about the case. The West
German system does not totally eliminate discretion and thus the necessary flexibility it affords.
It merely transfers the responsibility for the exercise of discretion from the prosecutor's office
to the courts, thus greatly reducing the possibility of abuse of discretionary power and its
potential use for political ends.
4 9 Address by Attorney-General Elliot L. Richardson, Annual Convention of the American
Bar Association, Aug. 8, 1973, in N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1973, at 1, col. 6.
50 K. DAVIs, DISCRTImONARY JUSTIME-A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY, 207-09 (1969).
1 See generally Epstein, Political Sterilization of Civil Servants: The United States and Great
Britain, 10 PUB. AM. REv. 281 (1950); Esman, The Hatch Act-A Reappraisal, 60 YALE LJ.
986 (1951); Madama, The Hatch Act-A Constitutional Restraint of Freedom?, 33 ALBANY
L. REV. 345 (1969); Nelson, Public Employees and the Right to Engage in Political Activity,
9 VAND. L REV. 27 (1955); Rose, A Critical Look at the Hatch Act, 75 HARV. L. REv. 510
(1962); Note, The Hatch Act-Political Immaturity?, 45 GEo. L.J. 233 (1957).
2 See, e.g., codified portions of the Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1502 & 7324 (1970).
8 See, e.g., United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (upholding validity of
the Hatch Act); Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882) (restrictions on political contributions).
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The courts have traditionally upheld the validity of such restrictions because
of the notion that employment in government service was a privilege, not a right.
4
To enjoy this privilege the employee had to waive certain first amendment rights
which other citizens were free to exercise.5 Perhaps in the nation's past, when
state and federal payrolls were small, this rationale was justified. Today, however,
the character of government service has changed. First, a substantial portion of
the national work force is employed by federal, state, and local governments, 6 and
a person may have no choice other than to seek governmental employment. Sec-
ond, large numbers of public employees are engaged in work which has been
traditionally considered solely within the realm of the civilian sector of the econ-
omy.7 In addition to these changing characteristics, the Court has rejected the
idea that the exercise of a constitutional right can be denied by classifying the
receipt of a governmental benefit as a "right" or as a "privilege."
8
Given these fundamental changes in the character of the modern civil service,
the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncements on this issue are disappointing.
In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,9 the Court upheld the constitutionality of an Oklahoma
statute which substantially restricts the partisan political activities of employees in
the state's classified civil service. A companion case to Broadrick reaffirmed the
validity of the Hatch Act.10
In Broadrick, appellants were charged by the Oklahoma State Personnel Board
with violating § 818 of the state's Merit System of Personnel Administration Act."
4 "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional
right to be a policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29
N.E. 517 (1892) (Holmes, J.), as quoted in Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HAtv. L. REV. 1439 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Van
Allstyne].
5Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 1439.
6 In 1972, out of a total national work force of 80,216,000, the various levels of govern-
ment employed 13,377,000. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENsUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 230, 225 (1972).
" 'Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 1461-62.
8 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967). See also Mancuso v. Taft, 341 F. Supp. 574, 579-80 (1972), aFd,
476 F.2d 187 (1st Cir. 1973); Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 1458. Expanded activities of
government as a public employer make the restraints of substantive due process increasingly
necessary. Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 1461-62.
993 S.Ct. 2908 (1973) (5-4 decision).
10 United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 93 S.Ct. 2880
(1973). The Hatch Act, as codified in 5 U.S.C. § 7324 (1967), regulates the partisan political
activities of federal employees. The constitutionality of the Hatch Act was first upheld in United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). Although the continued validity of Mitchell
has been challenged, Letter Carriers emphatically reaffirmed the Court's holding in Mitchell.
See Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187, 197-98 (1st Cir. 1973), where the court speculated
the demise of the right/privilege distinction would render Mitchell obsolete. Cf. Van Alstyne,
supra note 4, at 1447 (suggesting Mitchell may have been decided incorrectly).
Although Broadrick and Letter Carriers used similar reasoning, the two cases can be dis-
tinguished. In Letter Carriers, the Court had a substantial body of Civil Service Commission
regulations and rulings with which to work. These materials tended to narrow the overbroad
portions of the Hatch Act. This was not the case in Broadrick, in which all that was available
to the Court were "a scant five rules that shed no light at all on the intended reach of
the statute." 93 S.Ct. at 2922 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"This Act has been codified in 74 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 818 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
§ 818], in pertinent part:
No employee in the classified service, and no member of the Personnel Board
shall, directly or indirectly, solicit, receive, or in any manner be concerned in soliciting
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Specifically, appellants were charged with soliciting political contributions from
their co-workers for the benefit of their superior. Appellants maintained § 818
was void for vagueness and overbreadth and urged the Court to declare the section
unconstitutional on its face.12
The Court dismissed appellants' vagueness claim by noting that even if the
exact parameters of § 818 were imprecise, this imprecision was not at issue since
appellants' solicitation of political contributions fell squarely within the "hard core"
of the statute's proscriptions.'$ In reaching this conclusion, the Court reiterated
its position in United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of
Letter Carriers,14 in which a similar vagueness issue had been raised:
[T]here are limitations in the English language with respect to being both
specific and managably [sici brief, and it seems to us that although the
prohibitions may not satisfy those intent on finding fault at any cost, they
are set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common
sense can sufficiently understand and comply with, without sacrifice to the
public interest.15
Appellants' solicitations were so dearly proscribed by the terms of the statute that
they would not be permitted to benefit from any alleged peripheral ambiguities
of the statute.
While dealing only tangentially with the vagueness issue, the Court devoted
substantial time to appellants' overbreadth challenge. Essentially, the Court held
that appellants' active solicitation of political contributions could not be considered
protected first amendment activity. Therefore, since the Court is not a "roving
or receiving any assessment, subscription or contribution for any political organization,
candidacy or other political purpose; and no state officer or state employee in the
unclassified service shall solicit or receive any such assessment, subscription or contri-
bution from an employee in the classified service.
No employee in the classified service shall be a member of any national, state
or local committee of a political party, or an officer or member of a committee of a
partisan political club, or a candidate for nomination or election to any paid public
office, or shall take part in the management or affairs of any political party or in any
political campaign, except to exercise his right as a citizen privately to express his
opinion and to cast his vote-,
Similar to the Oklahoma statute is a provision of the Hatch Act which restricts the partisan
political activities of state employees who work for state agencies which are funded in whole
br in part by the federal government. 5 U.S.C. § 1502 (1967). The constitutionality of
this provision was upheld in Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127(1947), which was a companion case to.Mitchell.
12 Appellants in Broadrick also asserted an equal protection claim which the Court dismissed
in a footnote. The Court felt that it was no denial of equal protection to regulate the
political activities of employees in the classified civil service while the political activities of
emp!oyees in the unclassified service went unregulated. The Court reasoned, "a State can
hardly be faulted for attempting to limit the positions upon which such regulations are placed."
93 S.Ct. at 2913 n.5.
The Court did not touch upon the larger equal protection issue which was thoroughly
analyzed in Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187 (1st Cir. 1973). The Mancuso court felt that
the discrimination between public and private employees was of itself a denial of equal protec-
tion. A similar argument is used by Professor Van Alstyne, when he notes, "[a] regulation
which restricts the continuing eligibility of employees to the class willing to conform to an
unreasonable rule of conduct ipso facto establishes an arbitrary classification. Such a regulation
denies equal protectiop and is therefore unconstitutional." Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at
1455.
13 93 S.Ct. at 2914.
14 93 S.Ct. 2880 (1973).
15 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2913-14 (1973).
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commission," appellants would not be permitted to assert vicariously the constitu-
tional rights of other public employees.16 The Court did say that in certain first
amendment cases it would relax its traditional rules of standing if the statute
under scrutiny had an adverse effect on the free exercise of speech. With respect
to appellants' claim, however, "where conduct and not merely speech is involved
: .* the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well,
judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."' 17 The Court concluded
that § 818 was not "substantially" overbroad and that whatever overbreadth might
exist could be cured through case-by-case adjudication.
In analyzing appellants' overbreadth claim the Broadrick Court had a choice
between two distinct methods of review. One method would have been to review
the statute on an individual or "as applied"' 8 basis, judging the statute "in terms
of the result worked by its application in the instant case. ' 1  This was the method
the Broadrick court purported to use.20 The second method would have been
to review the statute facially; that is, to judge the statute in terms of the "chilling
effect" 21 on the protected activity of parties not immediately before the Court.
The technique is not limited to review of statutes challenged on the basis of over-
breadth, but may also be used to invalidate statutes which affect fundamental inter-
ests or statutes which do not comport with the "less drastic" means doctrine.22
The individual or "as applied" method is in accord with the Court's long-
standing position that "constitutional rights are personal and may not be asserted
vicariously." 28  There must be real controversies between the actual parties so that
constitutional issues are not decided in the abstract.24 This method permits the
Court to save an otherwise legitimate statute by striking only the impermissible
construction. Facial overbreadth review, on the other hand, "is an exception to
[the Court's] traditional rules of practice." 25  In certain limited cases, the Court
will adjudicate the rights of parties who may never appear before it because the
parties are deterred by the statute's overbreadth from exercising constitutionally
protected rights.26 Since this method of review permits the Court to void a law
on its face, even parties such as the Broadrick appellants, whose own conduct
is within a statute's proscription and who might otherwise be constitutionally pun-
ished, are allowed to benefit.2 7
Ostensibly, the Court determined the constitutionality of § 818 on an "as ap-
plied" basis because (1) appellants' solicitation of contributions came within the
'Old. at 2915.
17 Id. at 2918.
18 Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
'9 Id.
20 93 S.Ct. at 2915-18.
21(Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965). But see Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971). While Younger did not expressly overrule Dombrowski, the Court tended
to limit the "chilling effect" standard to those statutes that directly abridged free speech.
401 U.S. at 51.
22 For a discussion of "less drastic" means see text accompanying notes 52-54 infra.
23 93 S.Ct. at 2915.
24 See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 383 (1964) (Clark, J. dissenting); Saia v.
New York, 334 U.S. 558, 571 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
25 93 S.Ct. at 2917.
26See Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808 (1969).
27 Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REv. 844, 847 (1970).
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"core" of the provision, and (2) the provision regulated conduct, not speech.28
The Court, in other words, reached its decision by focusing on the type of activity
the statute purported to covet. This distinction between speech and conduct can
be subtle, and a person exercising first amendment rights often engages in both
types of activity.2 9 Further, an overbroad statute regulating conduct can cause
as great a constitutional injury as an overbroad statute regulating speech. Thus
merely looking at the nature of the activity may leave a whole class of privileged
activity-conduct-unprotected. For example, in Zwickler v. Koota,30 the Court
had before it a New York statute which prohibited distribution of anonymous
handbills. In a case like this, to draw a distinction between where speech "ends"
and conduct "begins" seems at best to be artificial. Fortunately, the Zwickler Court
did not do this.
By distinguishing between the types of activity, the Broadrick Court was forced
to devise a separate overbreadth standard for each. Under this approach a statute
regulating speech will be reviewed on its face if has "ordinary" 3' overbreadth,
whereas a statute regulating conduct will be reviewed on its face only if it has
"substantial" overbreadth. This may be a distinction without a difference since
"overbreadth" by definition implies an element of the substantial. Traditionally,
successful invocation of the overbreadth rubric has meant that the statute involved
28 While the rhetoric of Broadrick was that a strict "as applied" method of review would
be used, the Court went considerably beyond the facts of the case,-in listing a virtual ipse
dixit catalogue of prohibitions that would be constitutional:
[T]here is no question that § 818 is valid at least insofar as it forbids classified
employees from: soliciting ontributions for partisan candidates, political parties, or
other partisan political purposes; becoming members of national, state, or local com-
mittees of political parties, or officers or committee members in partisan political
clubs, or candidates to any paid public office; taking part in the management or affairs
of any political party's partisan political campaign; serving as delegates or alternates
to caucuses or conventions of political parties; addressing or taking an active part in
partlsan political rallies or meetings; soliciting votes or assisting voters at the polls
or helping in a partisan effort to get voters at the polls; participating in the distribu-
tion of partisan campaign literature; initiating or circulating partisan nominating
petitions; or riding in caravans for any political party or partisan political candidate.
93 S.Ct. at 2918.
While this language may have corrected some of the vagueness of § 818, it certainly
did nothing to narrow the construction of the statute. In fact, the Court's dictum may even
increase the "chilling effect" on protected activity. For example, the line between vigorous
political debate with one's co-workers and "soliciting votes" can be very thin, with the result
that the employee's personal political expression may be less "vigorous" and even "chilled."
The Court's statement that Oklahoma can permissibly forbid employees from "becoming
... candidates to any paid public office," would seem to squarely overrule Mancuso v. Taft,
476 F.2d 187 (1st Cit. 973), which held that such a restriction constituted a denial of
equal protection.
29 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing of arm
band); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (civil rights demonstration). As dissenting
Mr. Justice Brennan noted in Broadrick:
More fundamentally, the Court offers no rationale to explain its conclusion that,
for purposes of overbreadth analysis, deterrence of conduct should be viewed differ-
ently from deterrence of speech, even where both are equally protected by the First
Amendment. Indeed, in the case before us it is hard to know whether the protected
activity falling within the Act [§ 818] should be considered speech or conduct.
93 S.Ct. at 2925.
30 389 US. 241 (1967).
81 The Court did not use the specific term-"ordinary" overbreadth.
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was already "too overbroad" to be cured by a series of judicial limiting construc-
tions.32
To compound the difficulty, the Court provided no guidance as to what "sub-
stantial overbreadth" might mean,33 which tends to render the standard unworkable.
As dissenting Mr. Justice Brennan noted:
At this stage, it is obviously difficult to estimate the probable impact of
today's decision. If the requirement of "substantial" overbreadth is con-
strued to mean only that facial review is inappropriate where likelihood
of an impermissible application of the statute is too small to generate a
"chilling effect" on protected speech or conduct, then the impact is likely
to be small. On the other hand, if today's decision necessitates the draw-
ing of artificial distinctions between protected speech and protected con-
duct, and if the "chill" on protected conduct is rarely, if ever, found suf-
ficient to require the facial invalidation of an overbroad statute, then the
effect could be very grave indeed.34
Since this guidance was not provided, the mere classification of an activity as "con-
duct" could make it substantially more difficult for a person to successfully chal-
lenge a broad regulatory scheme restricting that activity.
Rather than focusing on the nature of the activity involved, the Broadrick ma-
jority could have analyzed the nature of the interests affected by § 818. Since
a first amendment interest was involved, this approach would have rendered the
speech/conduct distinction nugatory and would have relieved the Court from the
need to devise separate overbreadth standard's for speech and conduct. The Court
could then have applied a traditional overbreadth analysis without regard to the
type of activity involved. -
The Court also could have analyzed appellants' first amendment daim in un-
equivocal "free speech" terms, holding that any restraint on the exercise of the
free speech value is unconstitutional.35 This, of course, is an extreme position
which has never commanded a majority of the Court. Rather, the Court has taken
the position that first amendment rights are not absolute, that under certain circum-
stances the state's interests can override the first amendment interests of the individ-
ual. For example, if a person's exercise of first amendment rights creates a "dear
and present danger" of bringing about a substantive evil which a legislature has
an interest in proscribing, then the state could lawfully prohibit exercise of that
activity. 36 As the epigram goes, no one has a right to shout "fire" in a crowded
theater. Implicit in such an approach is a balancing of the state's interests against
the individual's interests. This was the method adopted ir4 United Public Workers
v. Mitchell, 7 where the Court stated:
[T]his Court must balance the extent of the guarantees of freedom
32 Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967).
s3Nowhere in the decision did the Court define what was meant by "substantial" over-
breadth. Dissenting Mr. Justice Brennan voiced his concern over this when he noted, "IT]he
Court makes no effort to explain why the overbreadth of the Oklahoma Act, while real,
is somehow not quite substantial. No more guidance is provided than the Court's conclusory
assertion that appellants' showing here falls below the line." 93 S.Ct. at 2925.
84 93 S.Ct. at 2926.
85 "T]he First Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits any law 'abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press.'" Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941)
(Black, J.) (footnote omitted).
36 See, e.g., Gitlow v1. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
37 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
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against a congressional enactment to protect a democratic society against
the supposed evil of political partisanship by classified employees of gov-
erument.38
Although the Broadrick court did not discuss this balancing of the various interests
as such, it did acknowledge that important state interests"9 were involved, and
that the terms of § 818, if directed at private individuals, would be invalid under
the first and fourteenth amendments. 40
The right to engage in vigorous political debate and discussion is perhaps one
of the most valued rights protected by the Constitution.41 Indeed, it can be argued
that a major purpose of the first amendment is "to protect the free discussion
of governmental affairs." 42 The democratic operation of the nation's political sys-
tem is inextricably tied to the scrupulous protection of individual liberty, and free
discussion and participation in governmental affairs is an imperative of representa-
tive self-government. 43
Broadrick demonstrates the potential difficulties inherent in any analysis of inter-
ests, since the interest of the state and the interest of the public employee are
both vital, and mere "balancing" will provide no clue as to whose interest should
prevail. Ordinarily, if competing interests are essentially equal, the presumption
is in favor of the statute's validity;44 however this is not the case when a statute
burdens first amendment liberties. In fact, a reverse presumption obtains.45
Qne way the Court could have resolved the dilemma created by this seemingly
equal balance would be to examine the character of the interests involved and
to determine if the changes in the composition of the modern civil service warrant
a reappraisal of the state's interest. If the original reasons for restricting political
activity of public employees are no longer valid,46 the presumption against the
statute's constitutionality would be strengthened since this would present a dear
justification for application of the "reverse presumption" principle.
Given the profound changes in the composition of the modern civil service,
it is clear that traditional rationales such as the right/privilege distinction are no
longer viable. Today a substantial portion of the national work force is employed
by government, and, as the demand for government services increases, more people
will be drawn into public service. One commentator has suggested that a person's
chances for economic success are significantly limited if that person is denied access
to public employment; and, since the government does control such a great propor-
tion of the labor market, exclusion from government service substantially decreases
38 Id. at 96.
89 93 S.Ct. at 2913.
40 93 S.Ct. at 2918.
4 1 See, e.g., Bond v.'Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
4 2 
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
43 A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT 92-93 (1968).
44 See, e.g., Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 153 (1944).
45 [D]oubtful intrusions cannot be allowed to stand consistently with the [first)
Amendment's command and purpose, nor therefore can the usual presumptions of
constitutional validity, deriving from the weight of legislative opinion in other matters
more largely within the legislative province and special competence, obtain.
United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 140 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
46 "A view today, that running for public office is not an interest protected by the First
Amendment, seems to us an outlook stemming from an earlier era when public office was
the preserve of the professional and the wealthy." Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187, 196
(1st Cir, 1973).
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a person's bargaining power with civilian employers.47 Since a person may have
no choice other than to seek government employment and since the range of occupa-
tions in government is so varied, a broad prophylactic rule such as § 818 seems
wholly unjustified.4 8 True, the state's interest in protecting a public employee
from coerced participation in partisan politics remains vital; however the state's
interest in restricting the partisan political activities of a gardener or construction
worker should be different from its interest in restricting the political activities
of a department or agency head. A more carefully drafted statute would compen-
sate for this difference in interests, possibly by capitalizing on the difference between
proprietary and governmental functions, and provide greater protection for the
first amendment rights of the rank and file public employee.
Also, a statute like § 818 may actually be counterproductive to the state's inter-
est in good government. Laws restricting political activities of public employees
tend to diminish the pool of candidates qualified for public office,49 since a public
employee may be dissuaded from running for office if he knows he must first
resign. As the court noted in Mancuso v. Taft,50 public employees are uniquely
qualified to run for office because of their intimate knowledge of governmental
operation. Thus, although the Oklahoma statute may be designed to improve the
caliber of the civil service, it may accomplish that end to the detriment of a
highly qualified candidate pool.
In addition to the changing character of the state's interest, another factor
militating in favor of facial invalidity of the Oklahoma statute is that far less
draconian means are available to protect the state's interest.5 ' In addition to nar-
rowing the scope of the statute as discussed above, a liberal leave of absence
policy would accomplish the state's goals without unduly burdening the first amend-
ment rights of civil servants. 52 Thus, although employees wishing to run for
office would be required to leave temporarily the state's employ, they could return
to duty whenever their political activities were completed. Another alternative
would be to limit the employees' political activities to certain levels of government.
For example, a local employee would be permitted to engage only in state politics,
or a state employee would be permitted to engage only in national politics. 53 To
47 Van Alstyne, supra note 4, at 1461-62.
48 See Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187, 198-99 (1st Cir. 1973).
49 One factor the Court did not consider is that the carte blanche restrictions on the
political activities of public employees can result in a built-in demographic bias. In the
areas surrounding Washington, D.C., or state capitals, there are likely to be high concentrations
of government employees. Because the ratio of government employees to civilian employees
will be higher in these areas than in other areas of the nation, the pool of available political
participants could be critically diminished. See generally Hearings on S. 1474 Before the
Subcomm. on Privileges and Elections of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1965).
50476 F.2d 187, 194 (1st Cir. 1973).
51 See generally Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH
L. REV. 254, 267-93 ('1964); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE
L.J. 464 (1969).
5 2 Mancuso v. Taft 476 F.2d 187, 199 (1st Cir. 1973). See also Gray v. City of Toledo,
323 F. Supp. 1281 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Kinnear v. San Francisco, 61 Cal. 2d 341, 38 Cal. Rptr.
631, 392 P.2d 391 (1964); Minielly v. State, 242 Ore. 490, 411 P.2d 69 (1966).
53 It is difficult for us to see that a public employee running for the United States
Congress poses quite the same threat to the civil service as would the same employee
if he were running for a local office where the contacts and information provided
by his job related directly to the position he was seeking, and hence where the poten-
tial for various abuses was greater.
Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187, 200 (Ist Cir. 1969):
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protect an employee from being compelled to participate in politics at the insistence
of superiors, a statute sternly prohibiting abuse of political influence would accom-
plish the state's goal of protecting the employee without denying the employee
the exercise of first amendment rights.54
Since these reasonable alternatives were available to lessen the chill on protected
activity, and since the court will not undertake to rewrite a statute,55 the Court
could have declared § 818 facially void as an impermissible restraint on protected
first amendment activity.56 Appellants, of course, would have been the benefi-
ciaries of a constitutional windfall since a more narrowly drawn statute penalizing
their specific activity would undoubtedly have been permissible. 57 This, however,
should not have deterred the Court, since the first amendment rights of potentially
millions of government employees would have been vindicated.
CONCLUSION
While Broadrick is in accord with past precedent, the decision is unfortunate
because it did not attempt to correct the abuses of a system of political restrictions
which no longer reflects the realities of public service. Such abuses seriously inter-
fere with the exercise of protected first amendment liberties and should not be
permitted to stand. By focusing on the type of activity covered by § 818 instead
of the interests affected by the statute, the Court was compelled to formulate an
unworkable standard of review. Further, by failing to give adequate guidance
as to what "substantial" overbreadth might mean, the Court may in fact have
increased the "chill" on the exercise of protected activity, since parties may now
be uncertain as to whether their activity constitutes "speech" or "conduct." In
view of the vital employee interests involved and the availability of permissible,
yet less drastic, alternatives to the Oklahoma statute, the Court should have declared
§ 818 unconstitutional on its face.
John David Hvizdos
54 See, e.g., OHIo REV. CoDE ANN. § 143.44 (Page 1969):
No officer or employee of the state or the several counties, cities, and city school
districts thereof, shall appoint, promote, reduce, suspend, lay off, discharge, or in any
manner change the official rank or compensation of any officer or employee in the
classified service, or promise or threaten to do so, for giving, withholding or neglecting
to make any contribution of money or other valuable thing for any party or political
purpose, or for refusal or neglect to render any party or political service. (emphasis
supplied)
5A5See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
378 U.S. 500 (1964).
56 [Wjhen legitimate legislative concerns are expressed in a statute which imposes
a substantial burden on protected First Amendment activities, Congress must achieve
its goal by means which have a "less drastic" impact on the continued vitality of
First Amendment freedoms.
389 U.S. at 268 (footnote omitted).
57
"Cox's conviction was reversed even though the State might have been permitted to
punish the very same conduct under a statute properly drafted." A. Cox, THE WARREN
COURT 106 (1968), discussing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), cf. Aptheker v. Secre-
tary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
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